Friday, January 25, 2019

Centinel I, Part I: Context

            I must admit, the previous series went on far longer than I initially anticipated. And though I might at first feel some reflexive need to apologize for droning on and on so, a second thought causes me to hold my tongue. If, God bless you, you are among what I imagine to be the minuscule number of people who will happily read whatever I post week after week, you doubtless felt no reason to complain about such an extensive interrogation of Richard Price and his Observations. And if, God keep you all the same, you are among those who could take or leave what I have to offer – a category which necessarily includes the overwhelming majority of the species – you doubtless walked away somewhere around part IV or V when it became clear that things weren’t going to be wrapping up anytime soon. It being next to impossible for me to imagine anybody falling in between these categories – that is to say, someone who takes more than twelve thousand words to decide whether or not they’re at all invested in what they’re reading – I am accordingly given to claim that no harm has been done, and no foul recorded. Thus, we move right along. Granted, the series that begins here will most certainly be shorter than the last. But this should not be taken as any form of amends on my part, notwithstanding that which I owe to myself. Twenty-two weeks is a very long time to talk about any one document, engrossing though it may well have been. What follows, then, is something completely different, for my own sake as well as anybody’s.

            On that note, I ask my audience – of whatever stripe, stamp, or kidney – to cast their minds back to the period and the events of the late 1780s in the United States of America. The Revolutionary War has been over for several years, the Continental Congress continues to very loosely govern the various states under the auspices of the Articles of Confederation, and the American economy has experienced a rather slow, painful, and uneven recovery. In an attempt to rectify this stubborn state of financial malaise – in which hard currency is scarce, debts are rarely repaid, trade has stagnated, and the paper currency issued on the authority of Congress holds almost none of its value – a group of notables from each of the thirteen states agrees to meet in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 for the ostensible purpose of modifying the governing charter of the union of states. The aim of these assembled statesmen being the creation of a government better equipped to respond to the aforementioned economic tribulations, they fairly quickly determine that only a strong, centralized government will serve the purpose they have set out to fulfill. Accordingly abandoning the Articles of Confederation altogether, the delegates then set about framing an entirely new government for the United States of America, which they proceed to send to Congress for ratification in September. Though understandably surprised by the scope and scale of the document they have been asked to consider – the proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention having been conducted in secret – the members of Congress nonetheless agree to submit the proposed federal constitution to the various states in accordance with the accompanying instructions. State conventions are called, delegates chosen, and a vigorous public debate ensues.

            Enter the Federalist Papers and the Anti-Federalist Papers – both of which, of course, have been discussed here before, but neither of which ceases to offer ample reward for investigation. Specifically, enter Centinel, that pseudonymous – and seemingly spelling-averse –  author of some eighteen essays published between October of 1787 and May of 1788 whose stated aim was to dissuade his fellow Americans from too rashly adopting an entirely novel frame of government before giving due consideration to the flaws, deficiencies, and implications thereof. Though no more noteworthy in the substance and presentation of his views than such previously-discussed Anti-Federalists as Brutus (Robert Yates), A Plebian (Melancton Smith), and Mercy Otis Warren, Centinel nonetheless makes for an intriguing read, arguably for the very reason that the general thrust of his argument feels exceptionally familiar. Indeed, when one reads the first of his eighteen compositions – published initially in the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer on October 5th, 1787 – the sense of déjà vu is almost overpowering. Though arguing against the creation of a powerful central government at a time when he and his countrymen had fought a war against exactly that less than a decade previous, the basic contours of Centinel’s philosophy and perspective align extraordinarily closely to the tried-and-true playbook of the modern, states-rights advocating American conservative. Indeed, one gets the distinct feeling from reading Centinel I that the last two hundred years have not done very much at all to alter the basic character of political discourse in the United States.

Whether this should be a source of comfort or dismay, I shall leave it for each of us to decide on our own. There is, however, much to say on the subject of where such a persistent perspective originated and how it came to be a staple of the ideological dialogue of American republicanism. Whether one agrees with the small government hypothesis or not, its influence on the course and development of American history and culture is impossible to deny. It would therefore seem far from an idle pursuit to investigate – if not its origins – an early and very coherent manifestation thereof. How, for example, did the notion that government should be small and simple become a part of the discussion surrounding the ratification of the United States Constitution? From where did the critics of that document derive their belief that political authority should be highly decentralized? And what caused commentators like Centinel to conclude that the people could form a much surer check against corruption than any institutional safeguard? Surely these ideas developed out of some antecedent, or else originated in response to a particular set of circumstances. Centinel I, though fairly brief, speaks precisely to these kinds of inquiries, and in so doing arguably helps lay bare the means by which values that have become absolutely foundational to the political culture of the United States first entered the public discourse thereof.

Addressing and interrogating the significance of Centinel I will, of course, first require some knowledge of its author, their life, and the circumstances that led them to put pen to paper in the first place. This, unfortunately, is where the resources available to the modern investigator come up rather short. Beyond the widely-held conviction that the author of the Centinel essays was most likely a Pennsylvanian named Samuel Bryan (1759-1821), and the verifiable fact that they were initially published between October 5th, 1787 and April 9th, 1788 in the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer and the Philadelphia Freeman's Journal, there would seem to be very little else to say. Bryan, for whatever reason, evidently left no more substantial imprint upon the history of the United States than to have a set of political treatises – important, yes, but not earth-shaking – connected to his name. The years of his birth and his death are known, as well as the fact that he corresponded with Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) for a period in the early 19th century. Much more than that regrettably remains mysterious. This should not be taken to mean, however, that the customary examination of the applicable context for the forthcoming series will herewith cease and desist. If there is any maxim to which America, On Paper can be said to adhere unfailingly, it is to never say a little when one can instead say a lot. To that end, let us proceed to set the stage for a discussion of Samuel Bryan’s Centinel I by approaching the topic at hand in what we’ll call a lateral fashion. If we cannot talk directly about the author of the document in question, let us instead talk about the world in which he lived.

Thankfully, though Samuel Bryan yet remains something of a cipher, his father was by comparison both famous and well-attributed. George Bryan (1731-1791), born in Dublin in the 1730s and settled in Philadelphia in the 1750s, was, among other things, a merchant retailer and trader, a vocal opponent of the Stamp Act (1765), the first Vice-President and the second President of independent Pennsylvania, a justice of the state supreme court, trustee of the University of Pennsylvania, a long-serving state legislator, and an early advocate for the abolition of slavery. Noted by and among his peers as something of a radical, the elder Bryan was an avowed opponent of both colonial Pennsylvania’s proprietary governors as well as those who hoped to transform the colony into a direct possession of the Crown. By way of a refresher, the colonial Province of Pennsylvania was, from the time of its founding in 1681 until it became the independent Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1776, the private property of Quaker luminary William Penn (1644-1718) and his male heirs. Though the elder Penn was generally well-liked and well-regarded by the inhabitants of the colony he had founded as a refuge for those suffering religious persecution in Anglican Britain, his successors as proprietor frequently found themselves at the center of some controversy or other over issues ranging from freedom of conscience, to relations with local native peoples, to the taxation of properties traditionally owned by the Penn family. Bearing in mind that fellow Pennsylvanian Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) was likewise labeled a radical for his attempts to strip the hereditary proprietors of their office and turn the province into a Crown Colony, George Bryan’s apparent opposition to even this latter course would seem to have set him quite far indeed outside the mainstream of contemporary Pennsylvania politics. 
     
In addition to apparently taking all comers in terms of colonial Pennsylvania’s political status, the elder Bryan was also an early supporter of American independence – compared, say, to fellow Pennsylvanian John Dickinson (1732-1808), who was an extremely late supporter of reconciliation – and an ardent devotee of the style of government subsequently practiced in the Keystone State. Again, by way of a reminder, the state constitution which Bryan so favored and under which he served was among the most unusual then in force in the nascent United States. Drafted by a committee composed of Robert Whitehill (1738-1813), Timothy Matlack (1730-1826), Dr. Thomas Young (1731-1777), James Cannon (1740-1782), the aforementioned Franklin, and Bryan himself, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was both exceedingly democratic by the standards of the time and exceptionally decentralized. Having grappled with the authority of a very conservative, obstructionist governor during the height of the Anglo-American crisis – in the form of William Penn’s grandson John Penn (1729-1795) – the elements of Pennsylvania’s political culture already opposed to proprietary government became increasingly convinced that any kind of unitary executive at all invited more abuse, corruption, and strife than it necessarily solved any significant administrative problems. The governing charter subsequently drafted under the authority of the revolutionary Council of Safety accordingly did away with the office of Governor, established a unicameral legislature, and recognized the right of all tax-paying adult men – regardless of whether or not they owned property – to vote in and stand for elections.

In the absence of a unitary chief executive, Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution erected in its place a kind of committee known as the Supreme Executive Council. The members of this body – twelve in number – were to be chosen to serve a term of three years by voters residing in the city of Philadelphia and in each of the eleven counties into which the state was then divided. Coinciding with the yearly election of delegates to the state assembly, a joint ballot of the Council and this very same assembly was to be held for the purpose of electing a President and Vice-President of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from among the Counselors previously chosen. Perhaps the only responsibilities to be exercised by the President without the input of the Council were those connected to the role of Commander-in-Chief. All other executive powers – appointing judges, attorneys general, and military officers, filling vacant offices due to death or resignation, standing in judgement over cases of impeachment, granting pardons or reprieves, or laying commercial embargoes – were expressly the remit of either “the president and council” or “the president in council.”

In addition to the House of Representatives, the Supreme Executive Council, and the state supreme court – each of which respectively performed the necessary legislative, executive, and judicial functions – the constitution of 1776 also described a fourth body whose function and authority appeared to form a kind of hybrid of these otherwise separate spheres of responsibility. The Council of Censors, comprised of two delegates elected every seven years from each county and city in Pennsylvania, was intended essentially to monitor the activities of the other branches of government and offer correctives as its members felt necessary. To that end, the assembled Censors could censure government actions and demand the repeal of legislation they deemed to be unconstitutional, order the impeachment of such officials as appeared to have behaved improperly or abused their authority, and call for a convention to amend the constitution. No other state government erected during the 1770s or 1780s included within its constitutional framework a body of men anything like Pennsylvania’s Council of Censors, and it should perhaps come as no surprise that it was one of many innovations put in place in 1776 that was abandoned upon the drafting of the Keystone State’s second – and far more orthodox – constitution in 1790.

Granted, there were other state constitutions drafted during this era which envisioned a strong legislature and a weak chief executive. The Maryland Constitution of 1776, for example, declared that the Governor of that state was to be elected by a joint ballot of the bicameral General Assembly, and that said office was to be accompanied in its decision-making by a five-person Executive Council chosen by the same means. While this framework would seem necessarily to bind the office of Governor quite closely to the will of the relevant legislative body, the chief executive of the State of Maryland – alike with the governors or presidents of nearly every other state – nevertheless possessed a number of powers and responsibilities whose exercise did not require the consent or notification of either the Council or the General Assembly. Given that the framers of the various state constitutions had – with few exceptions – lived their entire lives under the auspices of colonial governments whose structure prejudiced singular executive authority – either in the form of a governor or of the Crown itself – this is perhaps not particularly surprising. Ardent though the supporters of Congress were in their opposition to the arbitrary exercise of executive power, their only involvement with government on a first-hand basis was along strictly monarchical lines. When it thus came time for these same statesmen to undertake the task of creating republican state governments, their imaginations were understandably somewhat limited by what they were familiar with and what they knew from experience would work. The results, for the most part, were either a chief executive whose powers were more or less the same as those exercised by their pre-independence colonial equivalents – as in New York – or whose authority was limited by, and tied to the will of, the relevant legislative assembly – an in nearly every other state. The fact that Pennsylvania did not follow this pattern should accordingly be taken as a strong indication that the men from whose pens the first constitution of that state flowed were of a deliberately unconventional frame of mind.

One of these men, of course, was the aforementioned George Bryan. A demonstrated radical in his opposition to both the proprietary form of colonial government and the alternative centered on the direct authority of the Crown, Bryan was seemingly able to at last give form to his abiding frustration with the status quo by helping to craft a new model of civil administration unlike anything Pennsylvania – or America at large – had yet seen. The vision of government he and his colleagues gave rise to was decentralized, subject to frequent elections, and premised on an unusually wide application of the electoral franchise. What this meant in practice was that decision-making at even the highest levels had to be made on a collegial basis, almost all power ultimately devolved upon the most representative branch of government, and only the destitute – i.e. those who paid no form of property tax – were formally excluded from the most basic from of civic engagement. Such a government would theoretically have been more resistant than its traditionally-structured counterparts to demagoguery, corruption, and elitism, more responsive to popular opinion, and less inclined towards deference to authority. Legislators were subject to the constant threat of replacement, the President of the state was little more than the titular leader of a twelve-member committee, and the power of censure, legislative invalidation, and impeachment were in the hands of a body of men kept structurally separate from any other branch of government. While it would be difficult to say exactly what the effect of these circumstances might have been on the political culture of Pennsylvania in those early years of its independence  – as far as levels of civic engagement are concerned, or respect for political authority, or satisfaction with political outcomes – it would nevertheless seem reasonably safe to assume that those who came of age in that state during the 1770s and 1780s would have had a very different experience with politics and public affairs than their counterparts in most other states during this same period. 

Bearing this in mind, we return once more to the subject of Samuel Bryan, son of George Bryan and author of the Centinel essays. Samuel, recall, was born in Pennsylvania in 1759. This would have made him only seventeen years old when the constitution his father helped draft was put into effect in 1776. Without making any assumptions about how impressionable he was as a youth, this would seem rather too young to have developed very many concrete biases as to the nature of political power, the purpose of government, or the proper relationship between a community of people and their nominal governors. It would accordingly seem entirely sensible to presume that the younger Bryan’s political opinions were almost entirely formed during, and shaped by, the eleven years which elapsed between the adoption of Pennsylvania’s first constitution in 1776 and the beginning of the process by which the proposed national constitution was ratified in 1787. At this latter point, Bryan would have been twenty-eight years old, and lived the entirety of his adult life under a system of government which had essentially no equivalent among Pennsylvania’s sister states. The closest in form during the whole of the Revolutionary era had been that of New Hampshire, whose 1776 constitution provided for a similar structure comprising a unicameral legislature and an executive council. After less than ten years, however, the people of the Granite State determined to replace this admittedly radical form of administration with something far more typical of what was becoming a standard model – with a governor, a supreme court, and a bicameral legislature – among the various American states.

Between 1784 – at which point New Hampshire abandoned its original constitution – and 1790 – at which point the Keystone State did the same – Pennsylvania thus constituted a major outlier in terms of the way its inhabitants were given to interact with and think about public institutions. Not only was this fact bound to have shaped the perspective and ideology of the aforementioned Samuel Bryan, but the prominent role that his own father had played in creating said environment must also have impacted on the ways in which he came to understand government and politics. This is not to say, necessarily, that the younger Bryan was in any way obliged to share – or even likely to share – the opinions and biases of his influential pater familias. While evidence certainly exists among the Founders of ideological alignment crossing generations within a single family – John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), for example, was often said in later life to resemble his father John Adams (1735-1826) in appearance, temperament, and opinion almost exactly – cases can also readily be cited of precisely the opposite state of affairs. William Franklin (1730-1813), eldest son of the aforementioned Benjamin Franklin, stands as a stark example of just that. Though William was a frequent traveling companion of his father during the latter’s various European sojourns, and though he benefited greatly from both his father’s partnership in business and patronage in politics – to the point of gaining appointment to the office of Governor of New Jersey in 1763 due in large part to the elder Franklin’s persistent lobbying of the government of Lord Bute (1713-1792) – he ultimately rejected Benjamin’s radical politics and became a prominent Loyalist leader during the American Revolution.

What this is all by way of saying, in effect, is that close familial connection was no more guarantee of political alignment during the Revolutionary era than it is today. Samuel Bryan, it therefore bears reiterating, should not be thought of as possessing particularly radical, democratic, or populist political views simply because he was the son of a man whose public career was premised almost entirely on the promotion of these very same convictions. Rather, the affinity which the younger Bryan arguably demonstrated in the text of the Centinel essays towards this particular ideological bearing should be attributed to the environment in which he first developed a sense of political awareness. To an extent, his father must have played some part in shaping this environment, either through implicit socialization or explicit education. But the mere fact of living and working in Pennsylvania was almost certainly enough on its own. From the time when he first gained adulthood in the mid-1770s to the moment he put pen to paper in 1787, Samuel Bryan was subject to, and given frequently to interact with, a government that was wholly unlike any other that then existed in America. Pennsylvania during those years was more democratic than any other state, more decentralized, and possessed of a system of public administration more amenable to both institutional and popular scrutiny. It would seem rather unlikely – if not impossible – for a person to spend over a decade living in an environment thus defined without being significantly influenced by the same. Granted, it was certainly possible for Samuel Bryan to have come out the other side of his early adulthood with a very low opinion of his home state’s government. The fact that a more orthodox constitution was adopted in 1790 would indeed seem to indicate that the majority of people in Pennsylvania were ultimately unimpressed by what they experienced in the 1770s and 1780s. The content of tone of Centinel I, however, stands as equally compelling evidence that Samuel Bryan was not among them. 

No comments:

Post a Comment