Friday, February 19, 2021

The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions, Part II: The Clear and Present Danger

    When Abraham Lincoln agreed to speak at the Young Men’s Lyceum in Springfield, Illinois on January 27th, 1838, it was almost certainly not for the sole purpose of burnishing his political reputation. So often this seems to be the only reason anyone in public service deigns to address the people they claim to serve outside of certain prescribed occasions, and 1838 was indeed an election year in Illinois. But the Representative of Sangamon County was plainly not attempting to sell any particular brand of ideological orthodoxy when he delivered the address in question. Rather than attempt to point up the inadequacies of the contemporary Democratic Party while also advertising for his audience the integrity and wisdom of the Whigs – a fruitless endeavor, given that he was speaking to a group of men largely too young to vote – he instead set himself to the task of describing and diagnosing a very specific problem which he had observed as acting to weaken the essence of American republicanism. His attitude was accordingly one of sincerity rather than salesmanship, caution rather than charm. “The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions” was not a campaign speech, in short, but an urgent call to action. Something was wrong with America, Lincoln believed, and it was up to each and every American to help set things right.

    Structurally speaking, the result was a fairly straightforward mix of observation and argument. Lincoln described for his audience what he believed was the matter – citing specific incidents from recent history to help clarify his point – and then proceeded to explain why it was he believed that the trend in question was a worrying one and what it was he felt that his countrymen ought to have done in response. For the sake of examination – and because Lincoln method suggests as much on its own – the examination that follows will approach each of these aspects separately and distinctly. The first section – indeed, the one you are reading right at this very moment – will explore the nature of the threat which Lincoln attempted to describe and the examples which he cited as evidence of the same. The second section – which you may now commence to awaiting with bated breath – will then proceed to delve into the broader framework of Lincoln’s stated position. Why was this thing he believed to be a problem such a problem? What was it that he feared, and what solutions did he offer? These questions, and others, will be answered therein. At this point – having sufficiently explored the “what” and the “why” of it all – the discussion will then shift into a third section in order to explore some of the implications of both the problems Lincoln identified and the solutions he sought to offer. The man was a cogent thinker, to be sure – keen-eyed and blessed with a sharp mind – and much of what he had to say in 1838 remains startlingly relevant almost two hundred years later. That said, he was also speaking from within a very specific cultural and political context, and it would quite simply be foolish to take all of what Lincoln had to say to heart without making note of some of the man’s more problematic assumptions.

    Which brings us back – back, back, back – to the speech, the lyceum, Lincoln, and 1838. What was it, according to Lincoln, that his countrymen urgently needed to confront? What was going on in the contemporary American republic that threatened to unravel the very fabric of self-government? Violence, in a word. Mob violence, in two words. Sanctioned mob violence, in a pithy but still descriptive three. As discussed in the previous entry in this selfsame series, the United States of America had witnessed dozens of civil disturbances over the course of the 1810s, 1820s, and 1830s between recurrent slave revolts and race riots in major urban centers, and it was the extent to which he believed his fellow Americans were becoming inured to the resulting bloodshed that most disturbed the young legislator from Sangamon County. The violence itself was bad enough, of course. Hundreds of people had been needlessly killed, often by shockingly cruel and brutal means. But what really seemed to bother young Lincoln was the degree to which these kinds of deaths were becoming an accepted aspect of American life. “There is even now something of ill omen amongst us,” he warned.

I mean the increasing disregard for law which pervades the country—the growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions in lieu of the sober judgment of courts, and the worse than savage mobs for the executive ministers of justice.

As a dark reflection of the promise at the heart of the American experiment in self-government, this was an alarming development indeed.

    The United States, after all, was possessed of what Lincoln described earlier in the same address as, “The fairest portion of the earth as regards extent of territory, fertility of soil, and salubrity of climate [,]” and operated, “Under the government of a system of political institutions conducing more essentially to the ends of civil and religious liberty than any of which the history of former times tells us.” What did it say, then, when a people so blessed by nature and their forefathers still managed to sink themselves into a morass of lawlessness and violence? What hope remained for the prospect of self-government if the people best suited to it still failed to master their self-destructive impulses? It did not bode well, to be sure. “Accounts of outrages committed by mobs form the every-day news of the times,” Lincoln accordingly observed.

They have pervaded the country from New England to Louisiana, they are neither peculiar to the eternal snows of the former nor the burning suns of the latter; they are not the creature of climate, neither are they confined to the slaveholding or the non-slaveholding States. Alike they spring up among the pleasure-hunting masters of Southern slaves, and the order-loving citizens of the land of steady habits. Whatever their cause may be, it is common to the whole country.

    Make no mistake, this was quite the claim at the time that Lincoln offered it. Still lacking anything on the order of a national media landscape, news tended to travel fairly slowly in the United States of the 1830s, and there existed no entity – publicly-funded or otherwise – which was either inclined to or capable of compiling comprehensive statistics on instances of civil disorder. That being said, Lincoln did not come to the Springfield Lyceum wholly unarmed. While he lacked specific evidence of any violent incidents taking place amidst the “eternal snows” of New England, he did describe three recent occasions of the kind of “mobocratic” behavior – having occurred in Mississippi, Missouri, and Illinois, respectively – which he claimed were at that moment threatening to unravel the very fabric of American republicanism. The first, and the earliest, took place in Mississippi, commencing when a group of gamblers were hanged. True, Lincoln admitted, not everyone would have considered this such a tragedy on its own, gamblers being, “A set of man certainly not following for a livelihood a very useful or very honest occupation [.]” Nevertheless, “Far from being forbidden by the laws, [gambling] was actually licensed by an act of the legislature passed but a single year before.” Already, then, as far as Lincoln was concerned, something had gone terribly wrong. Men who had committed no provable offence against the laws of the land had been sentenced to death by their neighbors and henceforth summarily executed. But then, somehow, things got even worse. “Next,” Lincoln continued, “Negroes suspected of conspiring to raise an insurrection were caught up and hanged in all parts of the State; then, white men supposed to be leagued with the negroes; and finally, strangers from neighboring States, going thither on business, were in many instances subjected to the same fate.” This process went on, evidently,

From gamblers to negroes, from negroes to white citizens, and from these to strangers, till dead men were seen literally dangling from the boughs of trees upon every roadside, and in numbers that were almost sufficient to rival the native Spanish moss of the country as a drapery of the forest.

    While Lincoln provided no more detail to this narrative than to say that it took place in Mississippi – imagining, no doubt, that it was notorious enough for his audience to require little more than that to jog their memory – a review of the various civil disturbances which occurred in the state within the span of the decade preceding turns up what is almost certainly the mass slaughter in question. The so-called “Murrell Excitement” took place – or at least had its origins – in the cities of Vicksburg, Mississippi and Nashville, Tennessee between July 4th and July 6th, 1835 as a result of an almost certainly erroneous pamphlet that was being distributed at the time. The “Murrell” in question was a petty thief named John Andrews Murrell (1806-1844) who had operated mostly in Tennessee during the 1820s and 1830s, stealing horses and slaves and being twice sentenced to long stays in prison. Early in the summer of 1835 – at a point, it bears noting, when Murrell himself was still incarcerated – a man named Virgil Stewart published and began distributing what he swore was a factual account of a conspiracy by which Murrell and his followers intended to spark a nationwide slave rebellion on Christmas Day in order to distract from their actual goal of turning the South into their own personal empire. While anyone who knew Murrell, or knew any of the details of his escapades, would have seen clear to charging Stewart – writing under the pseudonym of “Augusts Q. Walton, Esq.” – with giving the twice-convicted horse thief far too much credit, Stewart’s rather fantastical claims nevertheless succeeded in tapping into a vein of latent anxiety that ran through a large portion of contemporary Southern society.

    Notwithstanding the laughable miscasting of John Murrell as some kind of criminal mastermind, the memory of Nat Turner’s failed slave insurrection – having taken place less than five years prior in the summer of 1831 – was still fresh in the minds of many white Southerners, to the point that even the barest hint that something like it was yet in the offing could convince otherwise law-abiding citizens to abandon all reason and start casting about for supposed agents of chaos. The result, in short order, was a brief but bloody panic. On July 4th, across several locations in Tennessee, twenty slaves and ten white men were lynched after supposedly confessing their participation in Murrell’s plot. Two days later in the city of Vicksburg, a mob formed – evidently having been advised that such men formed a key constituency of Murrell’s support – with the intention of expelling all known gamblers from the community. When the individuals in questions understandably resisted such an intrusion upon their liberty of person, they were accordingly seized and five of them were hanged. None of these vigilante actions turned up any real evidence of a conspiracy, of course. Nor did the committees formed thereafter in communities across the South for the purpose of hunting down and punishing Murrell’s supposed co-conspirators. What they did accomplish, however, is what they were really intended to accomplish all along. Southerners who were anxious about the possibility of slave insurrections, troubled by the apparent lawlessness of their communities, and concerned by what they perceived to be the moral laxity of contemporary urban life were allowed – by way of state-sanctioned murder – to blow off some steam.

    The second incident which Lincoln described took place more recently and in the comparatively nearby environs of St. Louis, Missouri. “A single victim only was sacrificed there [,]” he admitted, compared to the several dozen who were killed in far distant Mississippi, and the story itself, he noted, was also “very short [.]” Nevertheless, he considered the account in question to be, “The most highly tragic of anything of its length that has ever been witnessed in real life.” The plain facts of it, as related by Lincoln, were as follows:

A mulatto man by the name of McIntosh was seized in the street, dragged to the suburbs of the city, chained to a tree, and actually burned to death; and all within a single hour from the time he had been a freeman attending to his own business and at peace with the world.

While this account, like his retelling of the Murrell Excitement, is likewise somewhat short on detail, the incident which it describes is substantially more well-known. Francis McIntosh (1810-1836) was a mixed-race man from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania who, at the time of his grisly death, worked as a porter and a cook aboard the steamboat Flora. Flora had just made port in St. Louis on April 28th, 1836, it seemed, and McIntosh decided to take the opportunity to visit with some of the crewmembers of another steamship, the Lady Jackson, which had docked the same day. As McIntosh was departing the Flora, a pair of police officers called out to him and requested his assistance in apprehending another sailor who had apparently been involved in a fight. When McIntosh declined, the officers placed him under arrest for interfering in the capture of a fugitive. Subsequently detained and brought before a local magistrate, McIntosh found himself charged with disturbing the peace. And when he asked how long he was likely to be imprisoned if convicted, McIntosh was told that his sentence was likely to amount to no less than five years. It was at this point, shocked and horrified, that the young man pushed back.

    Convinced, evidently – and not without reason – that he was unlikely to receive a fair trial and that his liberty was as good as forfeit, Francis McIntosh responded to his captor’s dour evaluation of his near-term prospects by promptly drawing a knife and stabbing the two officers who had taken him into custody. One of them was killed, the other was severely wounded, and McIntosh, in the resulting confusion, made good his escape. He managed to flee down the street, jump a fence, and take shelter in a nearby outhouse before the crowd that had coalesced as a result of the commotion caught up with him and returned him to police custody. At this point he was charged with murder and locked in the local jail. Sometime later, once news of what had transpired had spread throughout the neighborhood, a mob descended on the jail, dragged McIntosh into the street, took him to what were then the outskirts of St. Louis, and chained him to a locust tree. A pyre was built around his feet, said pyre was lit, and over the course of twenty minutes, Frances McIntosh was burned to death. When, the following month, a grand jury was convened to investigate the incident and potentially lay charges, the presiding judge – whose name, ironically enough, was Luke E. Lawless – succeeded in having the matter entirely dismissed. Naturally, Judge Lawless declared to the jury, he would have recommended the laying of charges if evidence of a crime existed on the part of any identifiable individual. But the lynching of Frances McIntosh was a mob action, responsibility for which was so completely disbursed among its faceless preparators that no case could possibly be made against them. And anyway, the judge elaborated, didn’t McIntosh sort of have it coming? Weren’t free black men like him just the tools of white abolitionists? Wasn’t it the duty of law-abiding white communities to protect themselves against such people and their radical agendas?

    The third such incident which Lincoln called to mind was also the most recent and the one least in need of detailed description. It had occurred, after all, but two months prior, and at a distance of less than one hundred miles. So familiar, indeed, was Lincoln’s audience likely to be with the event in question that he saw fit to mention it almost in passing. “Whenever the vicious portion of [our] population shall be permitted to gather in bands of hundreds and thousands,” he lamented, speaking of the dangers which he felt such occurrences represented, “And burn churches, and ravage and rob provision stores, throw printing-presses into rivers, shoot editors, and hang and burn obnoxious persons at pleasure and with impunity, depend upon it, this government cannot last.” Though he seemed to give them no special emphasis himself, it was the mention of editors and printing-presses that were almost certainly calculated to spark a specific remembrance in his audience.

    Elijah Lovejoy (1802-1837) had been the editor of an anti-Jacksonian newspaper called the St. Louis Observer which he had established in its namesake city in 1833. While at first taking on a specifically Presbyterian editorial position – from within which he criticized the Catholic Church and spoke out against the consumption of tobacco and alcohol – he gradually shifted his focus to the question of slavery, thus incurring the displeasure of a large portion of the local community. Indeed, more than once, as Lovejoy’s abolitionist bone fides became clear, were his person and his property the subject of shockingly violent threats. But while his printing presses were more than once damaged as a result of mob agitation, and while his friends more than once pleaded with him to avoid speaking out against slavery, the erstwhile editor refused to relent. It was only after Lovejoy began decrying the recent lynching of the aforementioned Francis McIntosh and writing critically of the behavior of the aforementioned Judge Lawless that he was forced to admit that he was no longer safe in St. Louis. His solution? Move the entire operation, otherwise unaltered, to Alton, Illinois.

    Alton, in fact, was not far at all from St. Louis proper, located but a stone’s throw away on the opposite bank of the Mississippi. And while Illinois was a free state in which the practice of slavery was legally prohibited, Alton was not exactly a haven of anti-slavery agitation. In some ways it was, of course. Because of its proximity to a major pro-slavery urban center, Alton was often the first place slaves seeking to escape bondage in Missouri took refuge when attempting to flee into the Midwest or points north. But it had also originally been settled by pro-slavery southerners, and as a result of its status as one of the first stops on what would at length become known in abolitionist circles as the “Underground Railroad,” it was regularly frequented by slavecatchers in pursuit of their quarry. By settling in a place like Alton, therefore, Lovejoy was arguably making something of a statement on the nature of his own activities and intentions. It was certainly not the safest place to which he could have re-located himself. Massachusetts would have been safer. Or Connecticut. Or New Hampshire. Really, anywhere in New England. And he was bound to continue facing criticism for his anti-slavery stance, particularly from those among his new neighbors who would have been quite content if Illinois became a slave state overnight. The fact that he nevertheless chose Alton would accordingly seem to indicate that he had not been driven out of Missouri solely on the basis of fear.

    Where Lovejoy ended up, he would still face threats. He would still have cause to be afraid to leave the house in the morning. But Alton was a much smaller community than St. Louis. And while it was, as the crow flies, not far away at all from that selfsame metropolis, it did have the added advantage of being in another state. This meant that while Lovejoy could be assured that copies of the newly rebranded Alton Observer would almost certainly make their way across the Mississippi into St. Louis, the kinds of people who had several times previously damaged his equipment in an attempt at putting a stop to his activities would be forced to think twice before trying something on that order again. Because while legal authorities in Missouri had plainly shown themselves to be perfectly willing to turn a blind eye to the at-times deadly activities of pro-slavery mobs, it was not quite so clear how legal authorities in Illinois would react if a gang of vigilantes from St. Louis attempted to cross the river into Alton so that they might damage the property of, or visit body harm upon, certain people residing therein. Clearly, there were people in Alton itself who would not have objected in the slightest, but would state authorities have been so lenient? Were anti-slavery Missourians confident enough in the laws of the state of Illinois to risk being indicted there, potentially for murder? In relocating to Alton, Lovejoy was arguably answering both of these questions in the negative. He was not going to stop speaking out against slavery, and he was not going to run away and take refuge in the comparatively welcoming embrace of anti-slavery East. But he was going to make a point of complicating the efforts of those who found his views to be objectionable.

    Lovejoy’s relocation into Illinois, for the record, took place at some point in the late spring of 1836. It was not until the end of the following year that managed to recover sufficiently from the damage done to his operation to fully re-establish the Observer and commence with his anti-slavery activities. And when he finally did so, his tone was more militant than ever. Emboldened, no doubt, by Illinois’s status as a free state, Lovejoy began advocating not just for the moral condemnation of slavery, but for sustained political organization for the purpose of abolishing the institution in all forms across the nation. To that end, in October of 1837, he helped organize the Illinois Anti-slavery Congress at the Presbyterian Church in Upper Alton where he had been serving as a pastor since his arrival in the middle of the previous year. While the gathering in question was reportedly well attended, however, it also happened to coincide with a degree of heightened economic tension brought about by the Panic of 1837. The product, ultimately, of a long-running conflict between the Jackson Administration and the leadership of the Second Bank of the United States, the Panic witnessed a nationwide credit crunch, falling wages, rising unemployment, and a general economic downturn. For certain people in Alton, the resulting financial instability made them exceptionally sensitive to any source of further economic disruption, particularly as it might have affected their trade with neighboring communities in the South. If merchants in Missouri, say, or Kentucky decided for whatever reason to cease doing business with firms or individuals located in Alton, the Panic left said firms or individuals with very little to fall back on. And what was Lovejoy’s ongoing anti-slavery agitation if not a prime reason for Southern producers and consumers to avoid doing business with the people of Alton? If the most famous thing about the Alton was that it was home to one of the most vocal abolitionists in the region, how could locals possibly hope to cultivate fruitful economic relationships with nearby communities in the slaveholding South? Something, clearly, had to be done.

    The “something” in question finally was done on November the 7th, 1837. Having evidently learned from the many previous occasions during which he and his property became the subject of mob violence, Lovejoy had since taken to operating his printing press from a secret location rather than as part of a newspaper office that was clearly marked and publicly accessible. To that end, the Alton Observer was, by the end of 1837, being printed out of a warehouse owned by a local firm called Gilman & Godfrey. On November 7th, having discovered that this was where Lovejoy had sought to hide his operation, a mob of disgruntled locals approached said warehouse with the intention of yet again destroying the press and putting a stop to the Observer’s publication. Finding the premises locked – and presumably convinced that someone was inside – several armed members of the crowd began firing on the building so as to drive any occupants out into the street. Lovejoy, who was indeed inside at the time, responded by gathering his assistants to the defense of the building and commenced to firing into the gathered crowd. Several of the vigilantes were injured as a result, one – a man purportedly named Bishop – was killed, and “the Siege of G&G Warehouse” was effectively commenced. When the mob attempted to lay a ladder against the building so that one of their number could set fire to the roof, Lovejoy and one of his assistants emerged just long enough to push it over. When the same tactic was tried again and Lovejoy emerged a second time, he was shot by members of the crowd and killed on the spot. Later, when the mob finally succeeded in breaching the building, the printing press was thrown out a window onto the riverbank and its pieces scattered and tossed into the Mississippi. While the matter did later come to trial, the proceedings were something of a farce. The jury foreman had been one of the besiegers. The presiding judge had been a witness. The final verdict, unsurprisingly, was a resounding, “not guilty.”

    As noted previously, Lincoln’s address to the Young Men’s Lyceum took place less than two months after this disgraceful episode and less then one hundred miles away. Surely no one, in consequence, needed to be reminded as to the details thereof. What they may well have required, however, as far as Lincoln was concerned, was for someone to explain to them just why it was that the death of some abolitionist down south had a bearing upon their collective future. Indeed, upon the future of the nation itself. Lovejoy was just a newspaper editor who had gone out of his way to make himself obnoxious to certain of his neighbors. And Frances McIntosh was just a black man who had committed cold-blooded murder. And those gamblers in Mississippi were hardly blameless in their own right. But the direct consequences, Lincoln argued, formed but a small part of the issue. Men had died and would die, for reasons just and unjust, by way of chance and choice. This was unquestionably the way of the world. But, he cautioned,

When men take it into their heads to-day to hang gamblers or burn murderers, they should recollect that in the confusion usually attending such transactions they will be as likely to hang or burn some one who is neither a gambler nor a murderer as one who is, and that, acting upon the example they set, the mob of to-morrow may, and probably will, hang or burn some of them by the very same mistake.

The issue, it seemed, was not the deaths themselves, regrettable though they may have been. Rather, it was the manner in which these deaths came about. Lynching. Mob violence. Vigilantism. Such things function by way of passion, and once set in motion do not easily give way to second thought. Someone truly guilty of murder may be their victim one day, but what of the next? Are the methods by which guilt is determined in such cases so unerring as to be infallible? In the absence of investigators and litigators, is it not possible for someone otherwise innocent to become a victim?

    Lincoln, for his part, answered very much in the negative. Police forces, and courts, and the very concept of law existed for many reasons, he urged, and not the least of them was because rumor and rage made poor substitutes for fact and forbearance. Blinded by anger, sometimes people made mistakes. Sometimes they accused those who were blameless, killed those who were innocent. The existence of basic rights and liberties, and the due process of law, were intended to prevent such occurrences from ever taking place. They did not always succeed, to be sure, but the lives they saved were far from inconsiderable. And while it might have seemed, once again, that the only victims of “mob rule” were those who did everything to deserve their fate, Lincoln endeavored to assert that such thinking was utter folly. “The innocent, he declared, “Those who have ever set their faces against violations of law in every shape, alike with the guilty fall victims to the ravages of mob law; and this it goes on, step by step, till all the walls erected for the defense of the persons and property of individuals are trodden down and disregarded.” And from thence, what was bound to occur? Once people grew to accept that justice was theirs to dole out as they wished, what would become of a society so debased?

    For those who view government as an obstruction to their own ambitions, Lincoln declared, such a breakdown would represent the culmination of all their hopes. “By instances of the perpetrators of such acts going unpunished,” he thus explained, “The lawless in spirit are encouraged to become lawless in practice; and having been used to no restraint but dread of punishment, they thus become absolutely unrestrained.” As with his previous attempt to spell out the practical utility of the presumption of innocence, Lincoln here seemed intent on explaining to his audience the essential purpose which certain moral and legal principles embedded in contemporary American culture and jurisprudence were ideally supposed to serve. Indeed, he seemed to harken back to the same 17th century English political philosophy to which so many of the Founders had declared themselves indebted. As Enlightenment scholar John Locke (1632-1704) famously asserted in his famous Two Treatises of Government (1689), individuals living in s state of nature would feel compelled to surrender a certain portion of their individual sovereignty to a supervisory entity – i.e., the state – in order to alleviate the need for every individual to see to the integrity of their persons and their property constantly and without relief. By the terms of the resulting “social contract,” the state thus assumes a monopoly on coercive violence with the understanding that force will only be applied to those who refuse to abide by the common will of the majority. Law represents the codification of this common will, and punishment represents the application of collective violence against its violators.

    Without necessarily citing Locke or making use of the term “social contract,” Lincoln nevertheless used some part of his speech at the Young Men’s Lyceum to essentially explain and reaffirm the validity of the principles thereof. When legal authorities in Mississippi, and Missouri, and Illinois shrugged their shoulders and looked the other way when confronted with blatant violations of the laws of those same jurisdictions, they effectively served to facilitate the surrender of the state’s monopoly on coercion. Granted, at the outset, license was likely only to be granted when the victims were those whom the authorities in question found to be most obnoxious. Gamblers, say, or black people, or those who dared to argue in favor of the fundamental equality of humankind. But how long before such a precedent would give way to a wider application? How long until death ceased altogether to be the exclusive tool of the state and became instead a matter of individual discretion? Until the only laws that mattered anymore were those of chance and public opinion? At this point, violence would be the norm, the law would cease to perform any useful function, and all that matters would be the possession and application of force. The people who committed such heinous acts as Lincoln described would most certainly be at the forefront of this process of social degradation – this return, as it were, to Locke’s purported state of nature. But even those who continued to hold fast to the law would be forced to play a part in its gradual decline.

    The purpose of the state, after all – certainly as Locke described it – was to provide a degree of protection to the individual, regardless of their ability, which the individual might not have been able to provide on their own. Freed from the need to maintain a constant watch on their personal integrity, or from being forced into servitude to those whose strength proved greater than their own, the individual was thus permitted to pursue ventures whose value was less immediate but still real and substantial. As the realization of certain of these ventures in turn serve to benefit society as a whole, the exchange by which coercion was made the sole possession of the state is arguably shown to be a reasonable one. But what if, over time, the state begins to surrender it monopoly on violence? What if the individual must once again devote some portion of their time to perpetually guarding against the violation of their personal sovereignty? This, in Lincoln’s opinion, was the direst potential consequence of the trend which he was seeking to describe. Much evil, to be sure, would be done by those who actively disregarded the law and attempted to dole out justice as they themselves saw fit. But the gradual disenchantment of the otherwise law-abiding would amount to a much greater evil in the long run. In time enough, Lincoln avowed,

Good men, men who love tranquility, who desire to abide by the laws and enjoy their benefits, who would gladly spill their blood in the defense of their country, seeing their property destroyed, their families insulted, and their lives endangered, their persons injured, and seeing nothing in prospect that forebodes a change for the better, become tired of and disgusted with a government that offers them no protection, and are not much averse to a change in which they imagine they have nothing to lose.

    This, in essence, was the crux of Lincoln’s dire forecast for the United States of America. It wasn’t just that he believed that the kinds of murders lately committed in Mississippi, Missouri, and Illinois would become more frequent as legal authorities increasingly declined to prosecute the perpetrators. To be sure, this did concern him. But what seemed to trouble him to an even greater extent was the notion that over time, as instances of mob violence became the norm, even those who would otherwise have counted themselves among the friends of the law would begin to lose faith in its efficacy. If people so inclined could commit murder at will, and if standing in opposition to those people was likely to result in being murdered yourself, then what was the point of the law? Indeed, what was the point of the government whose sole purpose it was to make and uphold the law? Why bother trying to defend any of it if it no longer served any useful function? Let it fall, let it be torn down, let the mob do as they please. Provided that the level of popular violence in the American republic reaches a level whereby all that is required to get away with murder is sufficient popular support, it would seem to matter very little whether the government of the day stands as it is or is replaced by something else. The people, by that point, will have learned to look to their own defenses, and the political institutions which their forefathers handed down to them will scarcely be worthy of further perpetuation.                

Friday, February 5, 2021

The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions, Part I: Context

     It would be difficult to deny that over the last handful of years a great many things have happened within the domestic political sphere of the United States of America which can fairly be said to fall well outside anything that the Founding Generation might have envisioned. Norms had been smashed, assumptions had been questioned, and many people have been given to wonder if the nation in which they find themselves living is really anything at all like the one they learned about in high school civics class. This has all given rise to a common enough lament. “It’s never been this bad,” people say. “We’ve never been this divided, this short of hope, this burdened by anxiety. We’ve never been this close to the brink of complete catastrophe.” People who say such things, in fairness, do not say them without cause. It may be the case that the United States of America has never experienced quite the succession of crises as beset it over the course of the years 2016 through 2020. But to imagine that the American republic has not faced anything even remotely similar to its most recent trials and tribulations? To claim that the union of states has never come as close as it is right now to complete and utter collapse? Utter shortsightedness. The United States has experienced recessions before, and epidemics, popular disturbances, crime waves, and partisan warfare. Indeed, for a memorable period in the 1860s it was even torn asunder by an outright civil war. None of this is to say that everything will be fine because it has always worked out in the past. Nor is it intended as a rap on the knuckles to those who would maintain that the early 21st century represents a uniquely tenuous moment in the history of the American republic. Rather, it is simply meant as a reminder of the importance of perspective. The United States has been through a great deal in its history; perhaps a fair bit more than most people remember. And while not every lesson learned from the crises of the past can be effectively applied to the trials of the present moment, some of them may well reward an effort at reexamination.

    This naturally brings us to the subject at hand, and to something of an explanation of the nature of the thing. Up to this point, with few exceptions, the documents examined herein have had their origins in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. “The American Founding” has been the unifying theme, and the focus of study has accordingly strayed very little from the Founders themselves and the literature which they produced. But now and then, as topics too intriguing to lay aside have made themselves known, a deviation or two has been hazarded. We’ve discussed documents which predate the Revolution from both the American and British perspectives, works of theatre, and cases at law. And we’ve delved as far afield as the 1830s in pursuit of some manner of insight into the evolution of American republicanism from the Founding Era to the Age of Jackson. The excuse so often proffered on these occasions – perhaps unnecessarily – was that a fair bit more than just the Revolution and its immediate aftermath have served to define the United States of America. The Foundering Generation was influenced – often deeply – by those who came before. John Locke (1632-1704) and Joseph Addison (1672-1719) may not have been Founders, but their writings were nevertheless critical in shaping the assumptions upon which much of America’s political culture has since been based. Just so, while Andrew Jackson (1767-1845) and John Quincy Adams (1767-1848) might fall safely outside the traditional definition of America’s Founding Generation, they have nevertheless exerted as significant an influence on the theory and practice of American political society as any member of that selfsame cohort. The likes of Locke and Jackson might not be Founders in the strictest sense of the word, therefore, but they have nevertheless left an indelible impact upon the American experiment.

    It is on this note, at long last, that we come to the document to be herein examined. As the title of this entry indicates, it is known by the name, “The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions.” It was delivered originally as a speech, in fact, at a public educational forum known as a lyceum in Springfield, Illinois on January 27th in the year 1838. The following month saw it published in local newspapers, greatly enhancing the reputation of the speaker, and arguably paving the way for what would at length become an fairly successful career in politics. The subject of the address was the nature of citizenship in a democratic republic. The speaker’s name was Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865).

    At this point in his life, Lincoln was not yet thirty years old. Born in central Kentucky to a struggling farmer named Thomas Lincoln (1778-1851), he had first accompanied this family when they relocated to Indiana in 1816, then struck out on his own in 1831 when they migrated into Illinois. The reasons for his ultimate departure are clear enough, on examination. Though possessed of scant little in the way of formal education, Lincoln took to the written word at an early age and with avidity, and his tendency to occupy himself with books and composition led his father to regard him as lazy and unmotivated. Abraham shared with Thomas, at the very least, his father’s dislike of the institution of slavery. The elder Lincoln found the practice to lend an unfair advantage to those who could afford to partake. But there was otherwise little love lost between father and son, and the younger Lincoln’s parting at the age of twenty-one marked more or less the final break in their relationship.

    Now freed of the obligation to turn over his wages to his family, Lincoln spent the next several years dabbling in ventures of varying success. At times this involved long-distance trading, moving goods into the slave states by way of the Mississippi River. At others, it amounted to the establishment of a general store in the town of New Salem, the success of which was notably lacking in spite of a booming local economy. In 1832, he first stood for office, putting forth his name for a seat in the Illinois General Assembly. And though he ultimately ended up losing this race, his popularity among the people of New Salem was meaningfully affirmed in the process. In the years that followed he served as their postmaster and county surveyor, became a captain in the local militia during its service in the Black Hawk War (1832), and by 1834 had built up enough personal popularity to win his second bid at elected office as Sangamon County’s representative in Springfield. Standing as a member of the protectionist, anti-Jacksonian Whig Party, Lincoln went on to serve four terms in the Illinois State Assembly, during which time he championed such infrastructure projects as the Illinois and Michigan Canal, helped to extend the state franchise to all white males living therein, and voiced his opposition to slavery in principle and his support for such measures – in keeping with the position of his mentor, fellow Kentucky-born Whig Henry Clay (1777-1852) – as the relocation of freed slaves to Africa by way of the Virginia-based American Colonization Society. In 1836, pursuant to years of self-directed study pouring over Blackstone’s Commentaries – the standard apprentice law text dating back to the colonial era – he was admitted to the state bar, and shortly thereafter opened a practice in Springfield under one John T. Stuart, cousin of his future wife.

    As of 1838, therefore, Abraham Lincoln was both a lawyer and a statesman. He was not a prominent figure on either count, to be sure, but at the very least he was already set on the path which would carry him forth to the end of his days. He was young, but well read. Inexperienced, but very astute. Not long in the practice of law, to be sure, but talented, and a man very much engaged with the prevailing political issues of the day. And what were those issue as of 1838? What else could they be in the age of Jacksonian Democracy but slavery, political violence, the franchise, and popular sovereignty? Of these, slavery was probably the single issue which could be said to have defined the entire period in 19th century American history between the first years of the Jefferson Administration (1801-1809) and the end of the Civil War (1861-1865). It was not always at the crux of every major event of this era – The Nullification Crisis, for example, was ostensibly about the nature of American federalism – but at the very least slavery remained a matter of constant public concern on the part of those who sought to protect it and those who would have seen it abolished.

    At the outset of American independence in 1783, the latter group had seemed to be very much on the ascent. Having evidently grown introspective following their victory over the British, Americans living in many of the northern states where slavery was of limited economic value began actively questioning the compatibility of the ideals for which they had but recently risked their lives – i.e., liberty, justice, the sovereignty of the individual, etc. – and the notion that some people ought to be held in perpetual bondage. The people of Pennsylvania struck the first blow against the institution in question, abolishing slavery there in 1780 before America’s independence had even been won. This opening move was followed by New Hampshire and Massachusetts in 1783, Connecticut and Rhode Island in 1784, New York (partially) in 1799, and New Jersey, at long last, in 1804. New York’s path towards abolition was by far the most difficult, slavery having become substantially integrated into certain sectors of the state’s agricultural economy, but a plan for gradual emancipation was eventually introduced which saw the final cohort of enslaved persons freed by the summer of 1827. This latter effort represented the apotheosis of the New York Manumission Society, founded in 1785 by none other than John Jay (1745-1829), and marked perhaps the high tide of anti-slavery political agitation in the pre-Civil War United States.

    This isn’t to say that Americans ceased to successfully organize for the abolition of slavery after the passage of the aforementioned legislation in New York. On the contrary, anti-slavery activities witnessed a marked increase particularly in the Northern states over the course of the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s. But by the time that the last slave in New York was set free in 1827, the principally Southern, slave-holding states had so completely coalesced around the idea that the institution of slavery was both economically essential and in need of protection that further domestic efforts to abolish it would end up meeting with increasingly rigid resistance. Consider, to that end, the relationship which eventually developed between the institution of slavery and American territorial expansion. Before the 1810s, new states joined the Union in a somewhat haphazard fashion. Free Vermont acceded in 1791, then slave-holding Kentucky in 1792, followed by free Ohio in 1803, and then slave-holding Louisiana in 1812. All throughout this era, it seemed, no one was particularly concerned with maintaining a strict balance of power in the Senate between the slave-holding interest and its anti-slavery opposition. But from the end of this early period right through to the time of Lincoln’s speech in 1838, slave states and free states were added in closely clustered pairs.

    Mississippi (1816), for example, joined along with Indiana (1817), Alabama (1818) was grouped together with Illinois (1819), the accession of Missouri (1821) famously necessitated the prior admission of Maine (1820), and the addition Arkansas (1836) was accompanied less than a year later by that of Michigan (1837). Neither the pro-slavery forces in Congress nor their anti-slavery counterparts were at all willing to let their opponents gain the upper hand, it seemed, in large part because of what they feared such an outcome would portend. The pro-slavery interest lived in terror of a federal ban on the institution, the Southern economy having become so deeply dependent on slave labor that its sudden disappearance would bring about the collapse of Southern society. The anti-slavery forces, on the other hand, absolutely dreaded the thought that slavery might once again become an unquestioned national norm. Control by the so-called “slave power” of the reigns of the federal government, they felt, would equate to federal protection of slavery in the existing states, the expansion of slavery into new states, and the gradual economic domination of the slave-holding business interests over those whose dependence on free labor rendered them unable to successfully compete. The ongoing territorial expansion of the American republic throughout this period accordingly became part of a larger game of socio-economic brinksmanship as opposing power blocs endeavored to preserve a tenuous stalemate that benefitted neither but at the least robbed their opponents of any particular advantage.

    Violence unsurprisingly played a huge part in how the tensions wrought by this ongoing competition effected the various American communities. Slave revolts, while not constant, were a far from unknow occurrence, with notable examples taking place at Chatham Manor, Virginia in 1805, the Orleans Territory in 1811, Spotsylvania, Virginia in 1815, and Southampton County, Virginia in 1831. The last of these, led by a local-born slave named Nat Turner (1800-1831) was particularly bloody, resulting in the deaths of over two hundred people in total. Meanwhile, in the ostensibly “free states” of the North, economic competition between working class white laborers – many of them immigrants from Ireland – and free blacks for jobs in burgeoning industries like construction and shipping led to recurrent outbreaks of violence in the form of deadly and destructive race riots in major urban centers. Such occurrences notably took place in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1829, New York City, New York in 1834, Washington, D.C. in 1835, and in Cincinnati again in 1836. The disturbance in New York is of particular significance to the topic at hand, fueled as it was by simmering local tensions between nativists and abolitionists. Over the course of nearly a week in early July of 1834, it seemed, businesses and newspapers owned by abolitionists, along with the homes and places of worship of the local black community, were targeted, ransacked, set ablaze, or else destroyed by roving mobs of white laborers and nativists who had been driven into frenzy by what they perceived as the conspiratorial activities of anti-slavery activists to raise the local black community to a more equal status in contemporary New York society. The state militia was ultimately called in to settle the disturbance, which more or less abated by the night of July 12th.

    As the pace and intensity of these kinds of incidents increased over the course of the 1830s, and the national anti-slavery movement steadily gained in strength, pro-slavery forces in Congress responded by introducing a series of resolutions intended to stifle any debate that might have otherwise been the result. Evidently, as the abolition of slavery became an issue of increasing concern for larger and larger swaths of the contemporary American electorate, petitions began flowing into the House and the Senate from private citizens and advocacy groups alike requesting federal legal action in the face of steadfast resistance on the part of state governments. Seeking to stem the resulting tide of popular pressure – presumably because they feared the effects of an ongoing public conversation on the issue – members of the pro-slavery, pro-states’ rights Democratic Party in the House began introducing a series of formal declarations intended to limit the ability of certain measures to be taken. The first of these, introduced on May 26th, 1836 by South Carolina Representative Henry L. Pinkney (1794-1863) – incidentily the son of Founder and Framer Charles Pinkney (1757-1824) – was presented in three parts. First, it stated that the United States Congress lacked the constitutional authority to in any way interfere with slavery as practiced in the states. Second, in response to calls for the abolition of slavery in the federally controlled capital district of Washington, D.C., it declared that Congress “ought not” to interfere with slavery in that selfsame city. And third, it introduced what swiftly came to be known as the “gag rule,” whereby, “All petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers, relating in any way, or to any extent whatsoever, to the subject of slavery or the abolition of slavery, shall, without being either printed or referred, be laid on the table and [...] no further action whatever shall be had thereon.”

    Unsurprisingly, it was this third resolution that met with the most virulent response. Whether or not the United States Congress had the constitutional right to interfere with slavery in the states was something of an open question in 1836, and it wasn’t necessarily improper or inappropriate for a majority in Congress to express its opinion one way or the other. Just so, it wasn’t necessarily wrong of that selfsame majority to state its disinclination to interfere with slavery in the District of Columbia. But by declaring their intention to automatically table any, “Petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers” having to do with slavery, after which, “No further action whatever shall be had thereon [,]” Pinkney and his fellow Democrats had proposed to commit a fundamental abrogation of the rights of the American people. As Massachusetts Representative and former President John Quincy Adams accordingly observed at the time, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteed to the people the right to, “Petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” If the House refused to hear certain kinds of petitions based on the subject in question, Adams thereby concluded, then the House was therefore guilty of violating the First Amendment rights of potentially millions of Americans. In may have been true, in point of fact, that the Democrats then in control of the House were never going to respond favorably to any calls to abolish or limit slavery in the states and were therefore only trying to save themselves the trouble of hearing petitions which they already knew they were going to reject out of hand. But even if convenience was the only motivating factor, Adams was still entirely correct to point out that the House had a constitutional obligation to consider every petition that was put to it in good faith.

    Seeking more to make a point about the sanctity of the First Amendment than out of any personal conviction on the subject of slavery – being, like his fellow Whig Lincoln, a believer in colonization – Representative Adams accordingly spent the next several years engaging in increasingly elaborate attempts to find loopholes in the rules and procedures of the House or else trying to fool his Democratic opponents into entertaining petitions whose substance they would otherwise have refused to consider. At times he very nearly succeeded in his efforts, his actions on February 7th, 1837 being a prime example of the same. Knowing full well that the matter would be tabled immediately, Adams nevertheless made a point of introducing a petition on behalf of “nine ladies” from the city of Fredericksburg, Virginia whose desire, presumably, was that slavery be abolished. Normally, pursuant to the aforementioned gag rule, the matter would have gone no further. But, as it happened, the Democratic Representative whose district in Virginia included the city of Fredericksburg expressed his curiosity at the identity of the “nine ladies” in question and asked to review the relevant petition. He thereupon discovered, to his displeasure, that petitioners were not, in fact, “ladies” as he had been led to believe, but rather nine free black women. Apologizing for the apparent error, Adams amended the document so that it read “women” instead of “ladies” and then proceeded to request that the House consider it regardless.

    When his request was immediately and summarily denied, Adams next moved to ask of the House whether it was permissible for him to introduce another petition on behalf of a group of enslaved persons. The resulting pandemonium culminated in a proposal to censure Adams on the grounds that, “By his attempt to introduce into this House a petition of slaves for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, [he had] committed an outrage on the rights and feelings of a large portion of the people of the Union [.]” Given time to respond to these charges, Adams humbly offered a pair of subtle but significant corrections. First, he said, he had not attempted to introduce the petition in question into the House. Rather, he had only asked if the House would consider such a petition if it were to be introduced. And second, he explained, the petition in question was not actually concerned with the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. It would therefore have seemed to violate no rules or procedures of which he was aware. Naturally, these clarifications did little to assuage the anger of Adams’s Democratic opponents in the House. Nor did they really do very much at all to harm the integrity of the gag rule itself. A resolution reinforcing the same would in fact be introduced in December of that same year, with a third to follow in December of 1838. But what Adams did accomplish – indeed, what he most assuredly intended to accomplish all along – was that he made the supporters of the gag rule in Congress look foolish. Not only had they followed along with his circuitous requests and clarifications and then violently overreacted when they realized what he had done, but they had also essentially been made in engage in a debate on a subject which they had previously declared they would no longer debate. The gag rule would remain on the books in the meantime, of course, but Adams would ensure, by way of tactics like these, that the topic of slavery was never all that far from anyone’s mind.

    And then, at long last, we return to Abraham Lincoln. As aforementioned, Lincoln was elected to serve in the Illinois House of Representatives in 1834 as a member of the Whig Party. This did not necessarily mark him out as an ardent abolitionist, to be sure. Some Whigs absolutely did support the wholesale elimination of slavery, and accordingly allied themselves with advocacy organizations like the American Anti-Slavery Society. But others, like party founder Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams, and Lincoln himself, were far more gradualist in outlook and favored the emancipation and removal of slaves from American society altogether over their eventual integration. Nevertheless – and though there were certainly Southern, pro-slavery Whigs – being a member of the Whig Party unequivocally meant being an opponent of the Democrats, the latter of which was so closely identified with slavery and its expansion that the Whigs became the de-facto mainstream political home for anti-slavery agitation. This association – between anti-slavery politics and Whig Party membership – was particularly relevant in a state like Illinois, where the Kentucky-born Lincoln eventually made his home. Slavery had been introduced into the region by French colonial authorities in the early 18th century and had persisted through the early 19th century in spite of the relevant passage banning the practice in the text of the Northwest Ordinance (1787). And while it was true that Illinois had been admitted to the Union as a free state in 1818, local attitudes towards slavery were decidedly mixed throughout the 1820s and 1830s.

    The southern half of the state, for example, had largely been settled by migrants from places like Virginia and Kentucky, and these residents and their descendants tended to favor the legalization of slavery and the introduction of plantation-style agriculture. At the same time, however, Illinois was also home to those who either opposed slavery on moral grounds or felt that the introduction of enslaved laborers would disrupt the state’s agricultural economy to the detriment of those who could not afford to purchase them. An early, prominent champion of this latter position was one Edward Coles (1786-1868), Governor of Illinois from 1822 to 1826 and former private secretary to President James Madison (1751-1836). Born in Virginia to one of the state’s many pseudo-aristocratic slaveholder families, Coles acquired a distaste for the institution during his time as a student at the College of William & Mary, determined to free his inherited slaves and leave his home state behind, and arrived in Illinois following his service under President Madison just around the time that the territory acquired statehood. Once settled, Coles proceeded over the next several years to purchase plots of land for each formerly-enslaved family that he had brought with him from Virginia, seek out employment for all those who required it, and tend to his responsibilities – pursuant to his appointment by President James Monroe (1758-1831) – as Register of Lands. And then, in 1822, he ran for governor and won.

    Though he reportedly never expected to succeed in his sole bid for elected office, Coles nevertheless seized the role of governor with a distinct lack of timidity. In his inaugural address, for example, Coles spoke unambiguously of his desire to both prevent the transformation of Illinois into a slave state and his intention to eliminate the last vestiges of the institution that yet stubbornly remained. To that end, he first led the opposition to a bill thereafter considered by the state assembly which would have set in motion a referendum on the possibility of holding a constitutional convention. Such a convention, he knew, was intended by its backers to allow for the legal recognition of slavery in the state of Illinois, and Coles accordingly endeavored to see the measure defeated at the outset. Then, when the referendum bill passed in spite of his efforts, he spent his entire salary as governor on a campaign to defeat the vote’s pro-slavery supporters by repeatedly dispelling economic arguments in favor of slavery and employing travelling preachers to emphasize the institution’s inherent immorality. When the results of the referendum were finally tallied on August 2nd, 1824, Coles once more laid claim to an unexpected success. In what was essentially a plebiscite on the legalization of slavery, the people of Illinois had voted in the negative by some 60%. Granted, this did not mark the end of Coles’ troubles with Illinois’s pro-slavery partisans. In 1825, for example, his pro-slavery Lieutenant-Governor attempted to wrest power away from him while he was away in Virginia. And a nuisance lawsuit filed by certain of his opponents over unpaid taxes on his manumitted slaves was not dismissed until very near the end of his term in 1826. That said, Coles had in the very least succeeded in keeping slavery out of Illinois. Attitudes towards the institution remained distinctly mixed, but a blow had definitely been struck against its formal recognition.

    By 1838, therefore, at the beginning of which year Lincoln delivered his speech on “The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions,” Illinois was in some ways still undecided on the question of institutional slavery. Though the use of slaves had been permitted in certain specific industries by the state’s first constitution – with the caveat that such permissions would expire as of 1825 – and though the southern third of Illinois was still home to many Southern migrants and their descendants, it was nevertheless unlikely that slavery would become the law of the land any time soon. The aforementioned efforts of Governor Coles had seen to this. That said, free black people were not always particularly well treated regardless. The indentured servitude of black laborers was still quite common, and slavecatchers from neighboring states like Kentucky and Missouri were permitted to roam Illinois with legal impunity. The Illinois Supreme Court, it was true, steadily built up a body of case law over the course of the 1820s and 1830s that closed most of the loopholes which permitted the continued servitude of the state’s black inhabitants, but attitudes in large swaths of the southern backcountry remained decidedly hostile to any talk of abolition. It was into this socio-political environment that Abraham Lincoln willingly stepped when he won his second bid for a seat in the state assembly in 1834. He was not a native of the state, of course, and so had not witnessed the efforts of Governor Coles in the 1820s. Nevertheless, he was a member of the mainstream political party wherein most opponents of slavery had been forced to make their home, and by 1838 had doubtless grown well acquainted with the major cleavages of Illinois politics. When he addressed the Young Men’s Lyceum in Springfield in January of 1838, therefore, he did so fully aware of where he stood, where his audience stood, and the nature of the community to which they collectively belonged.