Friday, May 8, 2020

Cato V, Part XXVIII: The Same Causes, contd.

            Aside from the Nullification Crisis (1828-1833) – and quite probably the passage of the Indian Removal Act (1830) – the event for which the presidency of Andrew Jackson is probably best remembered is the crisis which unfolded in the middle 1830s concerning the re-chartering and ultimate dissolution of the Second Bank of the United States. One of Jackson’s most steadfast political convictions – aside from his unshakable belief in the moral superiority of the office of President – was his virulent opposition to the very concept of centralized banking. Like Jefferson before him, Old Hickory was of the considered opinion that granting public sanction to a group of private shareholders simply because their wealth might theoretically be put to public use constituted an encouragement of iniquity wholly incompatible with the republican form of government. Possessed of privileges, influence, and resources denied to the American people at large, Jackson was of the conviction that these shareholders would effectively constitute a kind of financial aristocracy. Where the supporters of central banking saw economic stability, he saw the entrenchment of vested interests. Where they saw the growth of industry, he saw the growth of corruption. Nothing good could come from allowing a small number of wealthy men whom the American people did not elect to shape the American economy as they saw fit, he maintained. And if it fell to him to rescue the United States from becoming little more than a tool in the hands of profligates and speculators, he would not hesitate to do what needed to be done.  
   
            Ironically enough, the Second Bank of the United States had originally been chartered in 1816 at the behest of President Madison and Jackson’s fellow Democratic-Republicans in Congress mainly in response to the financial hardships that the United States had experienced during the War of 1812. Though the party of Jefferson had previously established its vehement opposition to the very concept of central banking during the debate which led to the establishment of the First Bank of the United States in the 1790s – and had earlier in the 1810s foiled the Federalist attempt at re-chartering that very same institution – the dire financial situation that the American republic found itself in at the close of its war with Great Britain primed the governing Republicans for a reconsideration of a number of their fundamental principles. This sense of financial desperation fortuitously coincided with a swelling of national pride engendered by Jackson’s own victory at the Battle of New Orleans in January of 1815 and the waning support enjoyed by the Federalists to produce a political environment ideally suited to radical change. Having previously denied even the constitutionality of a national bank, Madison and his supporters were now both willing and able to concede that the United States might in fact have stood to benefit from the existence of such an instrument of economic stabilization. The resulting institution would not precisely replicate every aspect of the First Bank of the United States – the Republicans yet reserved the right to decry “Hamiltonian” elitism and advocate for more generous access to credit – but it would nonetheless serve the same essential function. The national debt would be funded, loans would be secured, and private enterprise would be encouraged.

But while most of the extant Republican party – including such notables as former Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, Secretary of State James Monroe, and South Carolina Congressman John C. Calhoun – broadly supported this ideological about-face, a handful of its members remained stubbornly opposed to any deviation from established Jeffersonian dogma. Virginia Congressman John Randolph of Roanoke (1773-1833), whose bellicose temper and uncompromising disdain for all forms of nationalism made him simultaneously an object of ridicule and admiration, was by far the most prominent member of this latter group, but Jackson was assuredly among their number as well. His military career certainly led him to adopt a number of blatantly nationalist positions, not the least of which was the idea of using protective tariffs to promote domestic manufacturing. But central banking never seemed to achieve this level of acceptance with Old Hickory, notwithstanding the support it enjoyed among his fellow Republicans in Congress and the White House. Granted, he did not make his dislike of the Second Bank a major feature of his campaign for President in 1828 or declare at any point that he intended to see it dismantled. But his antipathy remained latent, like that of a significant number of Americans whose livelihoods had been injured by the Bank’s fumbling responses to the Panic of 1819, and it was arguably only a matter time until something fanned the embers of Jackson’s resentment into a fierce and spiteful flame.

To the credit of the Second Bank and its directors, its reputation had recovered significantly by the late 1820s from the missteps which had followed the Panic of 1819. By the time that Jackson was inaugurated as President in March of 1829, public confidence in the Bank was in fact relatively high. A sustainable balance had been struck under the leadership of Nicolas Biddle (1786-1844) between maintaining suitable reserves of hard currency, printing suitable quantities of paper money, establishing branch offices in the states, and making credit widely available. Even Jackson’s winning coalition seemed more or less to have made peace with its existence. Certain members of the newly established Democratic Party, it was true, remained critical of what they perceived to be the Bank’s excessive printing of paper bills and the inability of small-scale farmers to gain easy access to loans. But they could see as well as anyone that the Bank was too popular to attack in the immediate, and certainly not on the grounds that it had failed to serve the needs of the public. Fortunately for these skeptics – with Jackson chief among them – an opportunity presented itself soon enough to attack the Bank from a different avenue entirely. Over the course of the year 1829, rumors – as they have a habit of doing – began to circulate among certain interested parties that the Second Bank had attempted to interfere in the Election of 1828 to the supposed benefit of Jackson’s opponent. Branch offices in several states were said to have loaned more readily to those who pledged to support incumbent President John Quincy Adams, a disproportionate number of Adams supporters were said to have been appointed to the Bank’s board of directors, and Bank capital was said to have been contributed directly to the Adams campaign. There was little evidence to support any of these allegations, and a number of people close to the President actively denied that they could be true, but such things were only of passing importance. The spark of Jackson’s distrust had been successfully re-kindled. The Second Bank of the United States was unofficially on watch.

The saga that followed, between 1829 and 1834, began like something akin to a very clumsy game of chess. Biddle, conscious of the need to secure the cooperation of Jackson and his supporters if the Second Bank was going survive a vote on its re-charter in 1836, made the first move. Seeking to mollify the President, he accordingly put forward a proposal in November of 1829 whereby the resources at the Bank’s disposal could be directed towards the full retirement of the extant national debt. Jackson reacted positively to the overture. The national debt, as it happened, was the other core aspect of the Hamiltonian financial apparatus which he particularly disliked. But while Biddle’s plan was appreciated, he replied, and would surely be recommended to Congress at the first possible opportunity, the constitutionality of the Bank yet remained an open question. This was followed in December by a request in Jackson’s first State of the Union Address that Congress make a point of reconsidering the Bank’s legitimacy. Said institution having, “Failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency,” Jackson declared, it was accordingly unclear whether it was strictly necessary to maintain a national bank or if the Treasury Department might handle matters on its own. This was, in point of fact, a highly specious claim, the Bank having done much to stabilize the value of its notes by the latter half of the 1820s. As with the rumors of the Bank’s supposed political activities, however, the veracity of the accusation mattered little in the short-term. Jackson wasn’t reacting in the present to clearly demonstrable facts so much as he was laying the groundwork for the actions he fully intended to take in the future.

Biddle was understandably alarmed and dismayed when he heard tell of the President’s patently slanderous evaluation of the institution he was running. The re-charter vote, it was true, was over six years away, and it was possible that Jackson might not even be President when it finally arrived. But just as Jackson seemed to have been spurred to aggressive action by the evident popularity of his foe, so Biddle appeared to take Old Hickory’s re-election as a given and sought to confront, head-on, the probable consequences thereof. The first step, and probably the most involved, was to initiate a kind of public relations campaign whereby, over the course of several years and by way of personal appearances all over the United States, Biddle might manage to convince both the American people and their representatives in Congress that the Bank was as essential to the nation’s economic stability. A great deal of print media accompanied this effort, in the form of articles, essays, pamphlets, testimonials, stockholders’ reports, and petitions, with the Bank’s supporters in Congress making their own contribution by conducting investigations and submitting official accounts of the Bank’s soundness. This effort, once it got underway in the opening months of 1830, had the dual effect of both raising public awareness of the potential threat facing the Bank and restoring stockholder confidence following a serious decline brought on by Jackson’s aforementioned address. Since the President had yet to offer a more cohesive critique since then, or anything on the order of a potential plan of action – the events of the Nullification Crisis having quite successfully diverted his attention – matters thus appeared to have settled more or less in the Bank’s favor.

The brief period of détente that followed was effectively shattered by a series of events that took place between December of 1830 and February of 1831. On December 7th, as had been the case the year prior, Jackson once more called into question the constitutionality of the Bank in his State of the Union Address. “Nothing has occurred,” he declared, “To lessen in any degree the dangers which many of our citizens apprehend from that institution as at present organized.” In consequence, Jackson continued, it seemed only prudent that, “I should again call the attention of Congress to the subject.” The following February, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton (1782-1858) responded to this call to action by delivering a speech critical of the Bank’s legitimacy and calling for an open debate on its pending re-charter. Supporters of the Bank, led by National Republican Senator Daniel Webster (1782-1852), managed to stymie Benton’s initiative by calling a vote to end the discussion, but their margin of victory (32-20) was uncomfortably slim. Jackson thereafter offered public praise for Benton’s speech and announced shortly thereafter that he intended to run for re-election in 1832. In all, it had become quite clear quite quickly the Bank was well and truly in danger for its life. The period of temporizing that followed – wherein Jackson appeared to reach a compromise with his pro-Bank Treasury Secretary only to pull back at the last second at the behest of his anti-Bank Attorney General – was little more than a smokescreen. The President’s anti-Bank convictions had become well and widely known.

The response of the opposition National Republicans was more or less to cease dallying and proceed full force in favor of the Bank and its re-charter. First, at their national convention in Baltimore in December of 1831, the assembled delegates selected long-serving Senator and ardent nationalist Henry Clay as the party’s nominee for President. Clay had been a supporter of the Bank since its original charter was approved by Congress in 1816, and his belief in the efficacy of protective tariffs, central banking, and infrastructure spending was at the core of his public profile. Then, doubtless seeking to draw out the true extent to which the American people approved of the Bank or not, the National Republicans called for that same institution to be re-chartered well in advance of the established date in 1836. In the estimation of party leaders like Clay and Webster, the fate of the Bank was the ideal issue by which they embarrass Jackson and take control of the White House. Though anti-Bank Democrats were certainly prominent in the President’s cabinet and counted prominent members of Congress among their number, the National Republicans were nonetheless convinced that a sufficient percentage of Old Hickory’s own party were quietly in favor of the institution’s continued existence. Not only that, they further avowed, but the majority of the American people had already been convinced that the relative health and stability of the contemporary American economy was due to the Bank’s influence on credit markets and the currency supply. By making the Bank an election issue, they accordingly hoped to split the Democrats, undermine the otherwise unassailable popularity of Andrew Jackson, and score a resounding victory for their chosen nominee.

Nicolas Biddle, it turned out, was not so sure about any of this. On one hand, he had become increasingly convinced that Jackson was in no way inclined to compromise on the issue of the Bank. Old Hickory appeared to oppose its very existence on principle and seemed unlikely to settle for anything less than its complete dissolution. On the other hand, Biddle had also received numerous assurances from people with close connections to the Jackson Administration that the President was not prepared to veto a bill mandating the re-charter of the Bank if such legislation was duly approved by Congress. The key, these sources agreed, was to wait until after the election of 1832. “If you apply now," Treasury Secretary Louis McLane (1786-1857) thus wrote to Biddle, "you assuredly will fail,—if you wait, you will as certainly succeed.” Upon reflection, the Bank’s director decided, if possible, to postpone the re-charter effort until some point closer to the extant charter’s statutory expiration. Jackson remained an exceptionally popular figure, and it no doubt seemed wiser to avoid antagonizing him unnecessarily by potentially threatening his re-election. Unfortunately for Biddle, however, there were more things that warranted consideration than just his own inclinations. The National Republicans seemed willing to put the whole of their weight behind the re-charter effort only if it was launched in advance of the coming election, several of his fellow directors were anxious to take advantage of favorable support in the House, and the Bank’s shareholders expressed concern at the prospect of attempting to secure a re-charter bill closer to the date when the original 1816 authorization was set to expire. Hemmed in, as it were, on multiple sides, Biddle thus had little choice but to agree to pursue re-charter in the early months of 1832. The requisite bills were introduced in the House and the Senate in January of that year with respectable support among key groups of Democrats and every prospect of a safe passage.

Jackson and his allies did not react well to the introduction of the Bank issue into the context of the 1832 presidential election. While quite possibly inclined to let the matter lie fallow for a time until all concerned parties were able to have their particular grievances aired and addressed, the emergence of a partnership between the National Republicans under Henry Clay and the leadership of the Bank under Nicolas Biddle could only have been intended to thwart Jackson’s political prospects by driving a wedge between himself and his fellow partisans in the Democratic Party. The result, as it played out over the course of the year that followed, was exactly what Daniel Webster had eagerly tried to avoid in the early months of 1831: a public debate on the usefulness, necessity, and constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States. Jackson gathered his allies – the aforementioned Thomas Hart Benton, Tennessee Congressman James K. Polk (1795-1849), newspaper editor Francis Preston Blair (1791-1876), and Attorney General Roger Taney (1777-1864) – Biddle marshaled his resources, and the battle, before long, was well and truly joined. Jackson, for his part, came to understand fairly quickly that his side was likely to fail. Support in Congress for the re-charter of the Bank was simply too strong to hope for a favorable legislative outcome. Having thus determined to veto the bill once it came to him for his signature, the President and his allies instead directed their efforts towards drawing out the conflict and polarizing the electorate. If being pro-Jackson could successfully be fused with the idea of being anti-Bank, Old Hickory felt that his freedom of action might be substantially widened at the same time that his re-election was substantially guaranteed. The key, he and his cohorts understood, was to make Biddle and the Bank look as corrupt and untrustworthy as humanly possible.

Luckily for Jackson, Biddle was only too eager to oblige. During the six-month period leading up to the re-charter vote in the summer of 1832, he worked ceaselessly to both demonstrate the public’s support for the Bank’s continued existence to Congress and show Congress’s support for the Bank to the public at large. The former effort was harmless enough, taking the form, as it did, of public petitions gathered by branch managers and submitted to Congress for entry into the record of debate. The latter, however, strayed dangerously close to exactly the kind of political interference that Jackson and his allies had been actively decrying. Keen, as ever, to make use of every resource at his disposal, Biddle solicited pro-Bank articles from numerous members of the House of Representatives and had them printed and distributed as widely as he could afford. Whether or not this really convinced anyone whose opinion wasn’t already set of the legitimacy of the Bank and its positive effect on the American economy, it most certainly provided the Democratic press with ample fodder for claiming that Biddle and his pet institution were too willing and too able to bend the legislative process to their own selfish ends. Little harm was ultimately done to the prospects of the re-charter bill – it was approved by the Senate in June by a margin of 28 to 20 and by the House in July by a margin of 107-85 – but much harm was done to the public image of the Bank.

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