Friday, February 2, 2018

Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, Part X: Reconciliations

            Though it may appear something of a contradiction to repeatedly affirm the essential Britishness of some of the arguments offered in given document after having asserted at length the essential Americanness of certain other arguments in that same text, Jefferson and Dickinson’s Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms most certainly supports both readings of its author’s intentions. By July of 1775, Great Britain and the united colonies were essentially in a state of war, with casualties having been suffered on both sides as the Siege of Boston dragged on and the Invasion of Quebec neared the end of its planning stage. Having expressed and debated their own sense of identity, the legacy of their forebears, and their place in the British Empire at length in private and public discourse – in treatises and pamphlets and satires offered by the likes of Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin, among others – Americans were now being forced to weigh the depth of their loyalty to a distant monarch against the significance and implications of their personal and collective history. If the very fact of having taken up arms against British authority is any indication, the latter seemed to have prevailed over the former. The liberties that the people of British America enjoyed had been secured and sanctified by the blood and toil of their ancestors, Jefferson and Dickinson asserted accordingly, creating an obligation that cut deeper than obedience to governments or kings.

            At the same time, the means by which this conviction was expressed borrowed heavily and consciously from the history and traditions of Britain itself. Notwithstanding the assertions of people like Thomas Jefferson that the inhabitants of British America formed a distinct community from that which their forebears had left behind, Britain remained absolutely essential to the American cultural, political, and social vocabulary. The rights they believed their hallowed ancestors had sanctified – which they in turn felt it their duty to preserve – were explicitly British in origin. Accordingly, their points of reference in the context of a struggle against authority and for liberty were in large part British in character – from referring to themselves as Whigs to lamenting the violations being committed in Parliament against the principles of the Glorious Revolution. It was therefore entirely consistent that the mechanisms by which they asserted their sovereignty – i.e. establishing alternative governments to those they deemed no longer legitimate – should have likewise replicated the basic circumstances of key moments in British history. In asserting the primacy of their rights, therefore, and celebrating their status as political outsiders, and privileging principles like legislative supremacy and the rule of law, the united colonies were effectively attempting to carve out a space for a distinctly American identity within and according to the logic of the existing British socio-cultural sphere. 

            Certain elements of the text of Jefferson and Dickinson’s 1775 Declaration would seem to affirm this contention.  When given to reflect upon the nature of their dispute with successive British governments, for example, the scribes chosen by the united colonies to supply a written justification for their having taken up arms against the British administration of America appeared entirely comfortable with expressing respect for the institutions of the Empire, affection for many of the personalities that governed it, and even a sense of contentment with their homelands’ accustomed place as its far flung western province. Certainly they bore malice towards the ministers and military authorities whose greed, ambition, and corruption had done injury to the rights and liberties of the people of America. But this antipathy did not translate into any desire on the part of the latter to destroy the existing Anglo-American relationship. As the aforementioned document made quite clear, the united colonies were displeased with the governments of men like Lord Bute and Lord North, distrusted the actions of magistrates like Guy Carleton, and rejected the directives of officers like Thomas Gage precisely because they wished to preserve the relationship between themselves and Great Britain that had theretofore permitted both parties to flourish. Doubtless this appeared to the accused ministers and magistrates to be a contradictory and self-defeating motivation – how could one attempt to preserve the British Empire by threatening to destroy it? To the membership of the Continental Congress and their supporters in the various colonial governments, however, there was nothing self-defeating about it. In July of 1775 – in spite of the battles that had been fought in Massachusetts and New York, and the pending invasion of British Quebec – it was the sincere conviction of the leadership of the united colonies that they and their countrymen were proud to be British and would have preferred continuing to be so. For such an outcome to be acceptable, however, it would have to be on terms amenable to their particular American sensibilities.

            The manner by which it attempts to reconcile these impulses – the desire to be British and the desire to be American – is precisely what makes Jefferson and Dickinson’s 1775 Declaration so compelling. Whereas the current popular conception of the American Revolution – built upon over two centuries of memorialization and media depictions – tends to characterize the colonial population of late 18th century as having developed a uniform distaste for all things British by the time hostilities commenced in April, 1775, and furthermore inclines towards an understanding of the Battles of Lexington and Concord as a point-of-no-return for Congress and the British alike, said document gives evidence of a far less definite and far more complicated state of affairs. American affection for Britain remained high, it reveals, even after conflict had well and truly commenced. To that end, the object of armed resistance was not, as yet, to secure the independence of British America, but rather to accomplish the removal of those elements which had threatened the rights and liberties of the American people and further secure their place as willing and eager members of the British imperial family. That their declaration to that end approached the relevant issues of sovereignty and liberty in a manner entirely consistent with British history and tradition further attests to this conviction, naïve though it may have been.

            Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine any plausible scenario in which the Thirteen Colonies remained a part of the British Empire without any government thereof at some point threatening the rights and liberties of the American people in pursuit of political or economic centralization. What the united colonies seemed eager to preserve – and what certain supporters of America in British elite circles seemed to think it was possible to achieve – was a status quo whereby Parliament simply agreed by custom never to violate the sovereignty of the Crown’s subjects in America. Absent any laws or constitutional strictures to that effect, however – neither the Magna Carta nor the Bill of Rights had anything to say about the rights of British subjects not represented in Parliament – and in view of the pressures exerted upon the British Empire by its European rivals to secure its overseas possessions and their resources against foreign encroachment, this would seem a somewhat fantastical proposition. Whatever the means by which the various colonies were founded – via individual initiative, private capital, official patronage, or some mixture thereof – successive British governments had devoted money, men, and resources into seeing that they remained subjects of the Crown. Thus reinforced in the idea that British America represented a form of investment, a source of commodities, or a symbol of prestige, it would doubtless have taken a significant effort of will for the contemporary British elite – political, economic, or military – to commit to respecting the rights and liberties of fellow subjects in America. The terms of British Constitution placed them under no formal obligation to do so, and the practical needs of their ever-expanding empire effectively demanded they do otherwise.

            All that being said, the cited assertions put forward in Jefferson and Dickinson’s 1775 Declaration attest to the fact that the membership of the Continental Congress believed that a lasting reconciliation was possible. In spite of the actions of military officers and colonial administrators to more firmly secure British rule in North America – pursued, by all accounts, in good faith – the efforts of successive governments to lay taxes upon the colonies, regulate their trade, or influence their governments – carried out, to be sure, with the best interests of the Empire in mind – and vibrant examples of human weakness, cruelty, and ambition having played out in the process, they remained somehow convinced that it was possible to be British and American, that both of these identities were founded upon a fundamental respect for certain rights and liberties, and that a prosperous, powerful empire could exist that embraced this principle as its guiding light. Naïve, they may have been, or foolish, or short-sighted. But if they were those things, they were also optimistic, principled, and hopeful.

            And so, let that be what the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms represents – that in spite of the popular conception of the Revolution as being a vehicle for American anger or resentment at British rule, the Founders themselves have given us every reason to believe that theirs was a struggle based on hope.  

            Anyway, that’s just my slightly sappy take on it. Take a look for yourself. 

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