An Address to the People of the State of New-York, on the subject of the Federal Constitution, Part VI: Paradigms, both Stubborn and Changeable

Jay’s attempt in his 1788 Address to cast doubt on any hope of a successful second constitutional convention was, similar to his critique of the Articles of Confederation, also quite cogent and insightful. Proponents of this theoretical sequel to the Philadelphia Convention argued that, the merits of the proposed constitution having been debated at length in public meetings across the thirteen states, the American people would be better equipped to choose delegates in 1788 or 1789 than in 1787, and those delegates better prepared to discuss the relevant issues. This, Jay allowed, made some degree of sense. A better-informed convention, doubtless attended by men of at least equal talent to those who first assembled in Philadelphia, may indeed have proven itself capable of recommending meaningful modifications to the elements of the Constitution that had been particularly troubling to its critics. Or at least it may have done so, Jay cautioned, if the context of the debate hadn’t already shifted. “You must have observed,” he wrote in paragraph twenty-six,

That the same temper and equanimity which prevailed among the people on the former occasion, no longer exists. We have unhappily become divided into parties; and this important subject has been handled with such indiscreet and offensive acrimony, and with so many little unhandsome artifices and misrepresentations, that pernicious heats and animosities have been kindled, and spread their flames far and wide among us.    

However much the people of the United States had become better educated on the topic of national government and constitutionalism by the ongoing ratification debate, Jay believed that they had also become awakened to the latent political divisions that existed among themselves.

            There was, upon reflection, a great deal of truth to this assertion. The debate over the proposed constitution had indeed either created fissures in the political cultures of the various states or enlivened existing partisan divisions. Though far from the organized, incorporated, centrally-led parties which now dominate American politics, the factions that spawned out of the ratification debate proved themselves in short order to be surprisingly effective at mobilizing their followers and broadcasting their message. “Federalists” and “Anti-Federalists” from Massachusetts to Georgia often synchronized their efforts, shared and distributed each-other’s pamphlets, fielded pre-selected candidates for election to state conventions, and devised coordinated strategies. Prevailing rivalries between individuals and factions, particularly in states like Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia, often became folded into these newfound divisions, in many cases signalling a new, aggressive chapter in their ongoing partisan struggle. The bitterness that seemed to pervade the Pennsylvania state convention, culminating in the defeated minority’s disavowal of the proceedings, speaks specifically to the sense of discord that discussion of the proposed constitution had generated. Granted, a number of states had ratified the document with a minimum of disagreement, and the defeated minority at the Massachusetts convention demonstrated great magnanimity by agreeing to support the Constitution regardless of their personal qualms. That being said, enough dissent had been aroused in enough constituencies for Jay to rightly doubt in 1788 whether or not a formal attempt to modify the proposed constitution could hope to meet with anything like the impartiality that the task arguably demanded.    

In this sense, Jay effectively seemed to be pointing out that the Philadelphia Convention had been convened and gone to work in a unique and ephemeral moment in history. Because the delegates thereto had been chosen by their respective state legislatures for a purpose other than creating an entirely new government for the United States of America, there was no public expectation surrounding the document they ultimately crafted. Nation-wide debate over the necessity, dangers, or proper form of an effective federal administration had not been swirling for months before they met, and there were no factions then in existence whose partisans had a vested interest in seeing the thing succeed or fail. Delegates were able to meet and discuss this or that proposal or framework with frankness and candor – there was nothing at stake if they failed, and, thanks to the debates taking place in strict secrecy, no need to pander to popular demands. A second convention, summoned in the glare of the public opposition to the work of its predecessor, would almost certainly enjoy no such advantages and suffer under a host of added difficulties.

Chief among the latter, Jay asserted, was the inevitable involvement of the emergent Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions in choosing and promoting delegates for election. Faced, unlike in 1787, with the full knowledge of what their representatives were being sent to accomplish, he found it exceedingly unlikely that the states would select men to represent their interests at a second constitutional convention who were among the most moderate, rational, or willing to compromise. Rather, he feared the partisan divisions that had generated such animosity in states like Pennsylvania would simply be replicated – “The men most willing and able to carry points, to oppose, and divide, and embarrass their opponents, will be chosen,” he lamented. Or, worse yet, these tendencies would become exaggerated by the sense of partisanship that the ratification debate had brought to the surface. If, as in Pennsylvania or Massachusetts, the second convention supported a series of modifications to the Constitution by only a slim majority, Jay dreaded the likely public reaction. The American people, he argued in paragraph twenty-nine,

Especially in their present temper, would be more inclined to reject than adopt any system so made and carried. We should in such case again see the press teeming with publications for and against it […] Hence new divisions, new parties, and new distractions would ensue, and no one can foresee or conjecture when or how they would terminate.

Perhaps a second convention would have resulted in a mutually satisfactory constitutional settlement, but it evidently appeared to Jay just as likely to end in the intensification of the partisan strife it had been summoned to put to rest.

Though Jay seemed loath to speculate on the potential negative outcomes of a second convention – “no one can foresee or conjecture when or how they well terminate,” he wrote – it will here suffice to summarize a few noteworthy points. It first ought to be recalled that, by the time Jay penned his 1788 Address the Constitution had already been ratified by six states. If a second convention was called, it would perhaps stand to reason that the delegates from those states (Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts) would feel compelled to preserve the document that their countrymen had already pledged to support. This may effectively have divided the convention into rival camps in favor of and against extensive modification of the Constitution, the end result of which could well have been the dissolution of the United States. The same end may have followed if the second convention ultimately deadlocked over the same disagreements that had nearly arrested the progress of several state conventions. Faced with the realization that there could be no better version of a national government for the United States, critics of the proposed constitution might then have dug their heels in deeper than before, refused to compromise with their opponents, and compelled several states to reject the document altogether. With six states in favor of a new government, several states against, and no hope of achieving a satisfactory settlement, those in the minority might consequently have found themselves exiled from the union. If Jay’s assessment of the affection his countrymen felt for Congress and what it symbolized had any truth to it at all, this would have been a truly tragic outcome.

Absent a second convention, then, the question before the people of New York in 1788 remained relatively straightforward: would they ratify the proposed constitution as it was delivered to them, or reject it? Having attempted to convince his countrymen that the national government then in existence was inadequate to their needs, Jay put forward one final petition in the thirty-third paragraph (out of thirty-eight) of his 1788 Address that was particularly well-considered, candid, and pragmatic. The state of New York, he reminded his audience, had benefited from the inability of Congress under the Articles of Confederation to enforce the collection of customs duties on imported goods. Free to ignore the dictates of the feeble national government, authorities in Albany had instead determined to raise their own impost upon all merchandise brought into the state through the port of New York City. Because neighboring states like Connecticut and New Jersey lacked major port cities of their own, they had in turn been forced to buy the imported goods supplied by merchants in New York at an inflated price. The government of New York thereby collected a healthy surplus while its nearest neighbors suffered.

The prospect of getting out from under New York customs duties was one of the reasons several states, like the aforementioned New Jersey and Connecticut, ultimately agreed to ratify the proposed constitution. The stronger national government promised by that document would theoretically have been capable of collecting on the import duties it levied, thus preventing any one state from establishing a regional monopoly on international trade. With this in mind, Jay asserted that a rejection of the Constitution by New York stood to impact its economic prospects whether the document ultimately came into force or not. “Jersey and Connecticut,” he noted, “to whom your impost laws have been unkind–Jersey and Connecticut, who have adopted the present plan, and expect much good from it–will impute its miscarriage and all the consequent evils to you.” If the proposed constitution failed to achieve the requisite support to become the new law of the land, the states that voted in its favor would doubtless cast about for someone, or something, to blame. New York, among the small number of states to have profited from the weakness of Congress under the Articles, would doubtless have accordingly become a source of ire and resentment. “They now consider your opposition as dictated more by your fondness for your impost,” Jay wrote of New York’s nearest neighbors, “than for those rights to which they have never been behind you in attachment.” This slight, Jay, cautioned, would not be soon forgotten.  

Their hopes of achieving more equitable commercial relationships with their fellow states dashed by what they perceived as narrow greed, New York’s neighbors could conceivably have set out to punish their former sister-colony. “They cannot,” Jay wrote accordingly, “they will not love you – they border upon you, and are your neighbors; but you will soon cease to regard their neighborhood as a blessing.” New York City, though a tremendously lucrative trade hub, left the larger state vulnerable to economic disorder by the dependence it produced upon its business in the government in Albany. Accordingly, in the event of the failure of the ratification process, attempts made by states like Connecticut or New Jersey to sabotage or disrupt trade coming into New York City could well prove quite damaging. If this attempt at economic warfare extended to an outright blockade, however unlikely they may have been, there would seemingly have been little Congress could do to resolve matters. This fearful eventuality was made worse by Jay’s added warning that New York already had an enemy eager to revenge itself upon the larger state’s stubborn greed. “What advantage Vermont in combination with others might take of you, may easily be conjectured,” he wrote, recalling the eagerness with which authorities in that rogue state might have hoped to seize the opportunity to bring low their old adversary in conjunction with newfound allies. Again, there was likely very little the feeble national government under the Articles could have done to protect New York, or discourage other states from acting in malice against it. Thus, by hoping to preserve the weakness of the national government under the Articles in order to secure its own advantage, New York could possibly become the victim of the same.

It is hard to say how likely these kinds of scenarios may have actually been in 1788. Doubtless there were measures that a stymied New Jersey and Connecticut could have taken in order to injure the trade daily flowing into New York City. Though it perhaps pushes the bounds of credibility to imagine that they would have gone as far as some form of military action, certain contemporary observers of the United States under the Articles did at various points express concern that border disputes and commercial disagreements between states may eventually have led to outright warfare. With this in mind, it also bears recalling that Vermont – a disputed territory claimed by Albany but asserted by its residents to be a sovereign state – had already existed in an effective state of war with New York since at least 1775. While the armed confrontations, back-and-forth reprisals, and house-burnings did eventually give way to cooperation once the Revolutionary War began, New York’s continued refusal to recognize Vermont’s independence into the late 1780s doubtless served to reignite the resentment of that state’s beleaguered population. It is accordingly quite possible, without speculating as to the exact form or intensity, that the government of Vermont might indeed have been willing to take renewed action against the Empire State alongside those of its neighbors who felt ill-used by what they perceived as Albany’s heedless self-interest.

Speculation aside, Jay was entirely justified in attempting to point out to his fellow New Yorkers that their decision to ratify or reject the proposed constitution did not solely affect them. Because the success or failure of the Constitution depended on how many states chose to ratify it, a rejection by New York – one of the largest and most influential states – would likely have wrought significant damage to the overall project, perhaps even to the point of dooming it altogether. In the event of the latter outcome, the states that had come out most enthusiastically in favor of the new federal paradigm would doubtless have looked with resentment upon New York, its government, and its population. This potential outcome, offered by Jay in the spirit of caution and reproach, effectively pointed up a number of practical considerations he seemed to think his readers ought to have considered. Whether New Yorkers acted out of conviction or self-interest, and whether they accepted or rejected the proposed constitution, their neighbors were still going to be their neighbors – Connecticut and New Jersey weren’t going anywhere, and their citizens would be forced to live with the consequences of New York’s decision one way or another. It accordingly made sense for the people of New York to take into consideration the potential impact their own actions might have on the people they lived alongside, traded with, and to some degree depended on – not only because these people stood to harm them if disappointed, but also because maintaining a positive relationship stood to benefit New York in turn.  

In many ways, this was exactly what the ratification process was designed to do. Created as a national project – formulated by delegates from twelve of the thirteen distinct American jurisdictions – the Constitution was not merely intended to benefit the large states, or the small states, or the northern states, or the southern states. Rather, it was intended to forge a consensus between the whole thirteen and draw them closer together in terms of legal, foreign, and domestic policy. The terms of ratification seemed to anticipate and encourage this outcome by leaving it to the individual states to approve or reject the proposed constitution rather than the federal Congress. Though the residents of New York, or Georgia, or New Hampshire doubtless nurtured different priorities from one another, and would need to take these priorities into account when considering the new federal charter, its national character could not help but draw their minds towards a consideration of the larger union as well. If they chose to reject it, and the project failed, their choice would doubtless be remembered by those who voted in the affirmative. Alternately, if the Constitution was adopted in spite of their rejection, they would be left outside of the newly-reconstituted United States. Both of these potential outcomes, as well as the possibility of the proposed constitution being unanimously adopted, warranted the consideration of every American, Jay’s fellow New Yorkers included. Their state, he seemed inclined to point out in his 1788 Address, however much its economic preeminence might have caused them to think otherwise, did not, and could not, exist in a vacuum. Just as New York affected the states in its “neighborhood” by the priorities it pursued, so too could the states along its borders influence New York by the decisions their respective governments determined to make. The ratification debate exposed this logic in a very palpable way, though it remained for each of the state ratifying conventions to realize and respond to it.