Friday, August 5, 2016

An Animadversory Address to the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont, Part VI: the Wherewithal of Woods People

            Allen’s ability, and inclination, to perceive the conflicts in which he and his countrymen were engaged in a sophisticated way is also reflected in perhaps the most intriguing aspect of An Animadversory Address. In spite of his rather limited formal education, the various arguments Ethan Allen brought to bear against the government of New York in his 1778 pamphlet demonstrate a shrewd intelligence and a nuanced understanding of law, philosophy, and politics not usually associated with the “middling sort” of the Revolutionary era. Granting that this mass of men and woman – the farmers, petty merchants, soldiers, and small-scale manufacturers – were instrumental to the success of the American Founding, they have not been subject to the same kind of myth-making as the statesman, gentleman philosophers, and military officers that continue to dominate the historical pantheon of the Revolution. The net result would seem to be that casual 21st century observers have essentially replicated the perspective of their 18th century forebears – the common people were undeniably important to the success of America’s independence, but their individual intelligence or agency is largely inconsequential. Allen’s Animadversory Address conversely gives the lie to this notion by demonstrating that a backwoods farmer was as capable as his plantation owning, law-practicing countrymen of seeing the world around him complexly.

            The evidence of Allen’s defiant perspicacity takes a number of forms in An Animadversory Address, both offhand and deliberate. Examples of the former can be seen most clearly in paragraph three, wherein the founder of the Green Mountain Boys held forth as to the virtues of Vermont’s independent government. “To live in a state of anarchy,” he wrote in the third paragraph,

Has been found to be inconsistent with the wisdom and practice of mankind in all ages and nations […] Indeed, the state and condition of men urgeth, nay, necessitates them to adopt some form of government for their mutual protection and defence [.]

Allen embellished this general declaration by adding that,

The government of New-York never desired to exercise jurisdictional authority over the inhabitants of [Vermont], for any other purpose but to oppress and deprive them of their lands and labours; therefore, it is our duty and interest to yield them no subjection.

Though communicated with a good deal more concision than was usual among contemporary American pamphleteers, Allen’s contention that government was a natural outgrowth of the human desire for personal security, and that a government which failed in this purpose was thereby illegitimate, was unmistakably rooted in the social contract theory articulated by Enlightenment philosophers Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).

            In the American context, the primacy of the social contract, and Britain’s violation thereof, was referenced time and again – perhaps most notably in the works of Thomas Jefferson – as justification for the American colonies’ attempts to seek a redress of their situation by force of arms. Britain, so the argument went, had rendered its authority over the American colonies null and void by making the preservation of their accustomed relationship actively damaging to the latter. Throwing off British hegemony via insurrection was therefore entirely justified. Allen appeared to agree with this basic formulation and applied it to the ongoing dispute surrounding the New Hampshire Grants. Because the government of New York, in his estimation, had shown itself to be manifestly unconcerned with the wellbeing or security of the residents of Vermont, its claim of jurisdiction over them was rendered illegitimate. This distinctive interpretation of a well-worn philosophical principle speaks well of Allen’s shrew grasp of the political discourse of the Revolutionary era and his ability to perceive relationships between abstract principles and practical situations. While it is nearly impossible to determine whether he had read the original works in which the social contract was first explained and explored – as the likes of Jefferson, James Madison, John Adams, and John Dickinson most assuredly did – his use of this vital philosophical concept in his own work makes it clear that European political theory was not solely the domain of 18th century America’s social elite.

            Other examples, far more overt, of Ethan Allen’s surprisingly calculated and incisive approach to political rhetoric can be found in the manner An Animadversory Address set about countering an official declaration authorized by New York governor George Clinton in February, 1778. Said document, issued under Clinton’s hand and addressed to the residents of the counties New York claimed in Vermont (Albany, Charlotte, Cumberland, and Gloucester), offered a number of concessions to the holders of disputed land grants while maintaining a general antagonism towards, “The pretended state of Vermont, the pretended government thereof, or to any power or authority, pretended to be held or exercised thereunder.” Among said concessions, the state of New York was evidently willing to forgive, “All prosecutions, penalties and forfeitures” incurred by residents of the disputed region, acknowledge the legitimacy of land grants made by the government of New Hampshire prior to 1764, and nullify all interfering grants made by the government of New York after 1764. Confirmation of New Hampshire grants by New York was to come at the cost of five pounds for three hundred acres, with sixteen shillings added for every additional hundred, and quit-rents – a traditional form of land tax – were to be commuted at the rate of six-pence for every penny owed.
   
            Allen’s decision to reproduce the New York declaration in full in the middle of An Animadversory Address, though seemingly offering free publicity to his adversaries, likely represented a canny attempt on his part to permit Clinton’s administration to damn itself in the eyes of Allen’s audience. Rather than attempt to editorialize or parse the words approved and signed by New York’s formidable governor, and thus run this risk of being accused of taking quoted passages out of context, he presented his audience with the full and unabridged text. Though he proceeded thereafter in An Animadversory Address to dissect certain sections of the same, it would seem he was keen that his readers first gain a clear and unbiased understanding of exactly what the government of New York had offered the people of Vermont and the manner in which that offer was phrased. The foresight required of such a determination – the patience and restraint – reflects favorably on Allen’s skill as a debater, and flies in the face of the indiscretion that seemed to otherwise define his life and career. Indeed, prudence of this kind is not usually attributed to the “common people” of the 18th century, by contemporary authorities or later observers alike. Doubtless authorities in colonial and post-independence New York had come to understand Allen and his compatriots as little more than rustic, backwoods rabble-rousers, and in fairness they had done everything to deserve that reputation. What men like colonial Governor William Tryon or his successor George Clinton might not have expected, however, was for these same men to be capable of offering carefully considered rebuttals to New York’s written declarations. An Animadversory Address showed, by taking a very measured approach to refuting one of these declarations, how short-sighted such an expectation was, and is.

            Having repeated, in its entirety, the provisions for redress offered by the state of New York to the people of Vermont in February, 1778, Allen next proceeded in An Animadversory Address to dissect certain clauses thereof. The resulting counterarguments, rendered in paragraphs sixteen through twenty-four, sought to expose the emptiness of the promises put forward by the government of New York, and did so in a manner that left no doubt as to the acumen of their author. The first such rebuttal concerned the manner in which certain offers contained in the New York declaration were phrased. In the first and second articles therein, Allen recounted, the government of New York stated that all persons possessing land in the disputed territory who had purchased that land from authorities in New Hampshire, or had acquired it by some other means, and had not had that same land re-granted by New York were to have their property confirmed under the authority of the same. Though this might have appeared, in light of the almost decade-long struggle that had persisted between New York and the New Hampshire Grant holders, to have been a remarkably generous offer, Allen perceived that it was anything but. The articles in question, he wrote in paragraph eighteen, “Cannot be considered of any material consequence, inasmuch, as among almost the whole possessions referred to […] there are but very few, if any, but what are covered with New-York grants.” “This being the case,” he concluded in paragraph twenty, “What has been hitherto proposed, does not reach the essence of the controversy, as the New-Yorkers very well know [.]”

            With a remarkable economy of words, and a touch of causal disdain, Allen thus showed the magnanimity of the New York declaration to be little more than smoke and mirrors. The issue at hand, he reminded his audience, was the disposition of the lands granted by New Hampshire and New York. Grants that fell outside of this overlap – that had been granted by New Hampshire, or by some other party, and not by New York – formed no part of the controversy, and indeed could hardly be said to exist at all. By behaving as if this was not the case, the government of George Clinton had evidently attempted to project an air of liberality and kindness vis-à-vis the residents of the disputed territory. The success of this attempt, Allen suggested in paragraph twenty-four of his pamphlet, hinged on the people in question being too ignorant, short-sighted, or dull-witted to perceive a hollow bargain when it was put to them. Without making any claims or observations as to the mental acuity of the average Vermonter in 1778, and supposing that the government of New York had indeed counted on the population it sought to address being so easily swayed, it may at least be fair to say that Ethan Allen at least was possessed of a degree of insight not usually attributed to a man of his background, vocation, or social standing. The depth of Allen’s ability to perceive the contradictions or fallacies in the arguments of his opponents was demonstrated to even greater effect in paragraphs twenty-two, twenty-three, and twenty-four of An Animadversory Address.

            The third article of the New York declaration, which offered to confirm the grants of land made by the government of New Hampshire that had been subsequently re-granted by New York, was declared by Allen to be as lacking in substance as the two that preceded it, for reasons that were both grammatical and legal. The former explanation occupied the better part of the twenty-second paragraph, and presented a takedown of New York’s outwardly generous offer that was syntactically and logically complex even by the standards of the 18th century. The issue, Allen explained, revolved upon the use by the government of New York of the phrase, “And being so possessed, were afterwards granted by New-York [.]” While the overt intention of this clause was seemingly to denote that some portion of the land grants made by New York that fell within the disputed territory were already the possessions of the original New Hampshire grantees, Allen claimed to perceive a far less beneficent rationale at work. His accordant response is worth citing at length, if only so that the full effect of it can be enjoyed. “After such possession was actually made,” he wrote,

And the possessor being so in possession, at the time the grant took place, such possession shall be confirmed, but any later possessions cannot be included in the condition of “being so possessed;” for, a later possession was no possession at all at the time the condition of possession took place; and consequently, every possession which has been begun in the state of Vermont, since the lands were granted by New-York, must be lost to the possessor, and fall into the hands of the New-York grantees [.]

Readers of this series may be easily forgiven for becoming lost down the mazy semantic corridors of this labyrinthine linguistic construction. What Allen intended to communicate, in short, was that the offer in question could only have been intended to affect the New Hampshire grants owned at the time the interfering New York grants were made. Any lands purchased by an individual after New York had re-granted their original parcel were thereby to fall under the sole jurisdiction of the state of New York. 

            Granting that by 1778 Allen was like to find fault in just about anything the government of New York said or did, the esoteric avenue of attack he chose in paragraph twenty-two of An Animadversory Address would seem to indicate that his contempt for said government was something more than knee-jerk. And considering that his response to being branded an outlaw in the early 1770s by Governor William Tryon was to declare members of Tryon’s administration outlaws in turn – the 18th century equivalent of “no, you are” – a revelation to this effect is no small thing. Ethan Allen, after all, never attended any of the institutions of higher learning (Harvard, Yale, Kings College, the College of New Jersey, etc.) whose collective student body formed the nucleus of the Founding Generation. He was not, consequently, a formal student of rhetoric, logic, oratory, or composition as the likes of Jefferson, Madison, and Adams most certainly were. The course of his life – from farmer, to small businessman, to community activist, to soldier – seemed to reflect this general lack of intellectual refinement, and gave little indication that there was more to the founder of the Green Mountain Boys than a hot temper and a loose tongue. As An Animadversory Address demonstrated, however, education is not always a condition of intellect. A conventionally uneducated person can still possess wit, insight, and intuition, as Allen plainly did. By dissecting the language used by the government of New York in its 1778 declaration so carefully, critically, and subtly, Allen demonstrated that he was capable of piercing the rhetorical veil of ministerial munificence that attended the faux generosity therein, recognizing a contradiction between tone and substance, and drawing the attention of his audience to it. Similarly impressive – and in its way confounding – is the rebuttal Allen brought to bear against the government of New York’s offer to nullify the land grants it had made in cases of overlap with existing property.

            In such cases of overlapping claims, Allen quoted from the relevant section of New York’s declaration, the original grants made by the government of New Hampshire, “Shall be confirmed, the posterior grants under New-York notwithstanding.” Though, again, this clause may have been intended to present the Vermont disputants with as generous an offer as possible – so generous that they would think twice before refusing it – the founder of the Green Mountain Boys saw mischief in its implications. “For the legislative authority of the state of New York,” he declared in the twenty-third paragraph of An Animadversory Address,

To pretend as they do in their proclamation, to vacate any grants made by their own authority, in favor of any possession, and to confirm such possessions, by nullifying and defeating their own grants, is the height of folly and stupidity [.]

Land, he explained, passed from one possessor to another legally and without any terms or conditions to the contrary becomes the property of the second party notwithstanding the desires of the first party. The grants made by New York in the disputed territory west of New Hampshire, though perhaps ill-advised, were nonetheless legal and valid under the laws of New York. It would thus have been no more legitimate for New York to claim the power to unilaterally nullify said grants than for a man selling a plot of land to a friend to claim at some future moment that the sale was no longer valid simply because he wished it so. If the residents of Vermont accepted such a claim and submitted to the authority of the state of New York the government thereof might feel it had licence to, “Give a grant to-day, and vacate it to-morrow, and so on, ad infinitum. This would destroy the very nature of and existence of personal property [.]” Only by maintaining their independence from New York – and thus refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the New York grants – could Vermonters protect their property from the arbitrary whims of an authority so empowered.

            Though this may seem on its face to be a contradictory argument – New York being unable to nullify its own land grants and Vermont being obliged to – the distinction Allen was attempting to draw was between New York’s claim of legitimate authority in the New Hampshire Grants and his claim to the contrary. If the people of Vermont accepted New York’s offer to have the interfering grants nullified and their own grants confirmed, they would have been tacitly acknowledging that New York had held sway in the disputed region from the start. Furthermore, having effectively sanctioned New York’s right to invalidate grants of property made under its own authority, landholders in Vermont would have been helpless in face of claims that the grants they possessed were themselves invalid. Only by asserting that the parcels of land New York had doled out had never been valid or legal, as the Green Mountain Boys had long argued, could Vermonters protect what was theirs. In spite of his lack of formal legal training, Allen’s argument to this effect in An Animadversory Address demonstrated a level acumen uncommon among the middling sort to which he belonged. To George Clinton and Robert Livingston – Governor and Chancellor, respectively, of New York in 1778 and lawyers both – this would doubtless have been both unexpected and unwelcome. As Allen would have it, they were intent on duping the people of Vermont out of their land by given forth with honeyed words and high-minded promises. While it is not clear if this was indeed the case, what cannot be disputed is that Ethan Allen’s written refutation of the trickery he perceived was sophisticated, shrewd, and penetrating.

            The founder of the Green Mountain Boys was evidently aware that the reasoning he deployed in An Animadversory Address was set to confound expectations, and made a point of taking his adversaries in New York to task for underestimating the intelligence of the residents of Vermont. “FROM what has been said on the subject,” he wrote in the twenty-fourth paragraph, “It appears, that the Overtures in the Proclamation set forth, are either romantic, or calculated to deceive woods people, who, in general, may not be supposed to understand law, or the power of a legislative authority.” Though Allen almost certainly did not intended for this admonition to address any audience beyond that of his particular time and place, a 21st century reader could quite easily construe it as being pointed directly at them. Because there continues to exist, even within the high-toned atmosphere of academia, a perception that “the masses” or “the people” or “the commons” of history were little more than an undifferentiated mass of superstition and religiosity whose value lies chiefly in the statistics and patterns they provide for sociologists, demographers, and other theorists. Studies to the contrary – of particularly perspicacious peasants or lay preachers or folk hero agitators – notwithstanding, the restoration of agency to the laboring and middling classes of history (not to mention woman and minorities) has come very slowly and very inconsistently.

            The American Revolution, in spite of the populist language most often used to describe it, continues to exist in the popular imagination as an event and an era dominated by the words and deeds of the social and cultural elite. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton have been memorialized, and studied, and deified to an extent commonly afforded saints in traditionally Catholic countries. Books have been written, and plays, and television miniseries with lavish budgets and all-star casts; people know who the Founders are, and quote them liberally, even if they don’t always understand what they were trying to say. The great mass of citizen-soldiers who made up the colonial militias, or the men who enlisted in the Continental Army, or the sailors gave life to the Continental Navy, or the farmers who fed the lot of them have been remembered as well, but as a kind of faceless blank. They didn’t give voice to the Revolution, create the vocabulary of American citizenship, or even given pundits a handy phrase or two to throw around during moments of high partisan tension. They fought, and bled, and worked, and if they had thoughts as to what it was all for, they didn’t see fit to write them down. Perhaps as a result, their descendants have come to see them as unthinking, dull, or ignorant. They were farmers, and merchants, and soldiers, after all; what did they know about liberty, or natural rights, or the social contract? How intelligent could they have been if they didn’t go to Harvard, and write pamphlets, and draft constitutions, and spew forth brilliant oratory at the drop of a hat?

            Ethan Allen defies such easy dismissal. He was not very well-educated, lived primarily as a farmer and small-businessman, and served not one day of his life as a legislator. He was also hot-tempered, possessed of a distinctly insubordinate streak, and seemed as concerned about his own reputation as about the course of the Revolutionary War. He was not the scion of a vast family fortune (like Jefferson), the beneficiary of patronage (like Hamilton), or a self-made man (like Franklin), thus placing him outside the major archetypes of the Founding Generation. He appears, in short, to be everything that the sanctified Founders are not. What An Animadversory Address makes clear, however, is that he was nevertheless highly intelligent, perceptive, shrewd, and calculating. He understood law, and philosophy, and rhetoric in a way that defied his lack of formal academic experience, and demonstrated that he was eminently capable of bringing his knowledge and ingenuity to bear against those who would presume to underestimate him. This same pamphlet also demonstrated that his antagonism towards the colony and state of New York was not simply a function of a knee-jerk disdain for authority, but appeared instead to spring from a thorough consideration of the legal and philosophical implications of their claim to Vermont. Parallels were drawn between New York and Great Britain, causes were examined, and offers of clemency were dissected and refuted clause by clause. These were not the actions of a thoughtless, dull-witted commoner, but of a thoughtful, rational, intelligent individual. That Allen was also a middling farmer and entrepreneur should not be excused or diminished, but rather taken as cause to re-examine the perceptions nurtured by 18th century and 21st century observers alike of the common people of the Revolutionary era.  

            As ever, do please take the opportunity to judge for yourself: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N12446.0001.001/1:2?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

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