A dedicated devotee of the
philosophical Enlightenment, John Jay was also a political moderate as
Federalist No. 2 attests. He was certainly not alone in this; during the
Revolution many of Jay’s fellow New Yorkers, whose namesake metropolis was
particularly vulnerable to British naval attack, were similarly mindful of the
need to move the Congressional political process forward at a cautious and
carefully considered pace. For that matter he was also joined by prominent men
from other states, like South Carolina’s John Rutledge or Pennsylvania’s John
Dickinson, in occupying what might be called the moderate nationalist position.
Though it would be an oversimplification to say that all who fitted this label
thought a certain way, they were certain common positions which they tended to
share. Generally the moderates supported tried and true methods over untested
proposals; while not opposed to innovation they gravitated towards whatever
they felt would afford the best chance of success over what strictly aligned
with their principles. They also tended to be realists, not believing that
humans were completely virtuous or completely depraved but that strong,
reasoned argument had the ability to move people if properly presented. As
Federalist No. 2 makes clear Jay could, and did, stray into idealistic or
pessimistic arguments from time to time, but at heart he was a conciliator and
a diplomat and most often approached from the middle way.
This gravitational attraction towards
temperance can be seen as early as paragraph three, in which Jay began what
appeared at first to be a rather idealistic, or at least one-sided, argument
before shifting into a more cautious tone. Specifically, Jay asserted that
until recently (as of 1787) it was, “a received and uncontradicted opinion”
that America’s prosperity depended on the continuation of the Union, and that
all of the foremost characters of society were inclined toward the goal of its
perpetuation. Advocates for the dissolution of the Union, to the contrary, had
only recently emerged, and though their position was “extraordinary” they were
not without their adherents. This, in itself, is a rather troubling statement.
Considering once again that during the Revolution approximately 1/3 of the
population of the various states were supporters of independence, 1/3 sided
with the crown and the last 1/3 were more or less indifferent it would seem a
strange claim to make in 1787 that sentiments in favour of union were until
recently “uncontrodicted.” Taking into account as well the numerous disputes
that emerged in the 1780s between the states over trade, borders, and land
claims in the West I would ask to what era in the short history of the United
States was Jay tacitly referring to, when opinions were so clearly united
behind the object of continued unity?
Regardless
of his otherwise questionable claim, Jay managed to quite skillfully dovetail
into a call for caution and debate. Whatever it was that had by 1787 supposedly
convinced certain individuals in America that unity among the states was no
longer in their best interests, Jay wrote, “It certainly would not be wise in
the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully
convinced that they are founded in truth and sound Policy.” Here is the
moderate position; a realisation of clear disagreement between two sides, a
tacit admission that one opinion is correct and the other incorrect, and an
endorsement of sound argument as the best way to separate one from the other.
There is not only Hamiltonian manipulation here or Jeffersonian radicalism, but
a middle way that emphasises utility, debate, and the pursuit of truth.
Paragraph
eight is more obviously judicious in tone. In it, Jay admitted that though the
Articles of Confederation were symbolic of the desire that existed as early as
the 1770s for a Union of the states, the government they created was
fundamentally flawed. In point of fact, he claimed their deficiency was due to
the reality of their being drafted, “at a time when [the states’] habitations
were in flames, when many of their Citizens were bleeding, and when the
progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections, which must ever precede the formation of a wise and
well-balanced government for a free people.” Among advocates and critics alike
of the newly drafted Constitution rendering a verdict on the Articles of
Confederation and the government they laid out was a common tactic, and so Jay
was treading a well-worn path. Some, like Alexander Hamilton, dismissed the
Articles out of hand as a poorly conceived experiment; others, like
Anti-Federalists Patrick Henry or George Mason believed that the Articles were
sound in principle and preferable to a government that concentrated too much
power in the hands of too few people. As was his wont, Jay adopted a more
nuanced perspective than either of these extremes would admit. He believed that
Americans were attached to the idea of union, and that the Articles of
Confederation were an expression of that attachment. Unfortunately, and through
little fault of their own, their enthusiasm, inexperience and unenviable
circumstances had prevented them from formulating a government that was capable
of living up to their sincerest intentions. In this sense the proposed
Constitution was not a replacement for a failed system, but the culmination of
an ideal that the Articles had (imperfectly) set in motion.
Jay continued this narrative of
continuity and renewal in the ninth and tenth paragraphs of Federalist No. 2,
though in a somewhat more idealistic attitude. Indeed, Jay’s rather sunny
characterisation of the events surrounding the drafting of the Constitution of
the United States seem at times to directly contradict what we now understand to
have been a highly contentious process. For example, he stated in paragraph
nine that, “This intelligent people perceived and regretted,” the defects
inherent in the Articles of Confederation, and, “with one voice, convened the
late Convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under
consideration.” As Alexander Hamilton had pointed out in Federalist No. 1, there
were a number of people of the United States who perceived no defects in the
political status quo of the 1780s, and would have preferred that the Articles
of Confederation stay in place precisely because they stood to benefit from the
relative autonomy enjoyed by the respective states. Considering that Jay and
Hamilton were, in the realm of the Federalist Papers, collaborators intent on
speaking with a single voice, it stands to reason that they would have agreed
on most topics touching on the constitution they had mutually set out to
champion. That Jay would have so casually contradicted Federalist No. 1, and in
the essay that immediately followed it, seems quite a strange way indeed to
present a cohesive argument.
Similarly, Jay stated
in paragraph ten that the Philadelphia Convention was, “composed of men who
possessed the confidence of the people.” While not wholly untrue, this too is
something of a misrepresentation of the facts. The various delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 were invited to participate with the
understanding that the task before them was only the amendment of the existing
Articles of Confederation. It was only after the state delegations were
assembled and a quorum was achieved (which took some time) that those present
agreed that attempting to modify the Articles would only be a stopgap solution
and that an entirely new governing charter was called for. They proceeded on
their task in secret, with the
intention of presenting their proposed plan for government upon its completion.
Thus, while the men who assumed their stations in Philadelphia in 1787 did
enjoy the confidence of their respective state governments, their actions far
exceeded that trust in a way that many back home in Virginia, New York and
Massachusetts ultimately objected to.
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