Having adjourned
until noon the following day – March 15th, 1962 – the United States Senate
thereafter resumed consideration of the Alexander Hamilton national monument
bill which Senator Spessard Holland was preparing to use as a vehicle for his
anti-poll tax amendment. New York Republican Jacob Javits then proceeded to
introduce said bill, his fellow New Yorker, Kenneth Keating, then spoke to the
need for such legislation – Hamilton’s house, it seemed, was then going to
“rack and ruin” – and the Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, then moved that
debate should thereafter proceed. Whereupon, rather predictably, a brace of
Southerners made themselves known. And while Richard Russell was not among
them, the sentiments which he had expressed during the previous day’s debate
were nevertheless very much in evidence. The first to speak, as it happened,
was Alabama’s J. Lister Hill (1894-1984), a New Deal, populist Democrat who was
known to occasionally break with his more conservative colleagues in support of
legislation that gave greater power to the federal government. In this
instance, however, Hill appeared to be in a conservative mood.
First, Hill
echoed Senator Russell’s remarks of the previous day. The notion of
substituting a constitutional amendment for a piece of normal legislation, he
said, was “a most unusual and extraordinary and, I think, unprecedented and
preposterous course [.]” The Southern reputation for strict propriety was
well-earned, it would seem. Then – echoing Russell once again – he began
lamenting the loss of state power that the proposed amendment seemed to
portend. “This is an attempt to amend the Constitution,” he said,
To take away from the States the
rights which they have enjoyed from the very day the Constitution was written
and became effective. It is an attempt to take away their rights to fix the
qualifications of their electors. We oppose it because we are deeply moved by
our concern and desire and our willingness to fight for the preservation of the
cherished rights of our States to prescribe the qualifications of their
electors. I may say that these are rights which the Founding Fathers
specifically preserved and secured to our States in the original Constitution.
Such invocations of
the Founders have been a cornerstone of congressional debate since almost the
moment of the Founding itself, of course. No matter the position being taken by
the lawmaker in question, a precedent in its favor always seems to present
itself from among the writings and orations of that selfsame illustrious
cohort. To that end, Senator Hill noted accordingly that when the Constitution
was first drafted in 1787, a guarantee of state autonomy in terms of setting
the parameters of the franchise had been absolutely essential to securing the
final agreement of all involved. Bearing this in mind, he concluded, “there
would have been no Constitution if that right had not been clearly,
specifically, and absolutely preserved to the several States.”
The Senator from
Alabama was not wrong, of course, when he affirmed that state control over the
franchise had been very important to the Framers. It would be hard to name a
group of American political thinkers who, in their time, were more conscious of
the need to balance state and national power or who were more sensitive of the
specific responsibilities best allocated to each sphere. But there was a great
difference between the circumstances under which the Constitution was drafted
and those which, in the early 1960s, confronted the United States Senate. So
many of the Framer’s expectations and assumptions had been proven faulty or
misguided in the nearly two centuries that had elapsed since they collectively
hashed out the text of the American republic’s governing charter. Indeed, the relationship
between the federal government, the various states, and the American people had
changed to such a tremendous extent over the course of the 19th and
20th centuries from what the Founding Generation had envisioned that
one might be given to wonder whether the Framers would even recognize the
nation whose fundamental charter they had penned. To say, then, that a
particular practice was worthwhile simply because the Framers had endorsed it
did not – and does not – make for much of an argument in its favor. The
Constitution had, at the time of Hill’s remarks, been amended fully
twenty-three times. Clearly, there were many things about that original
document which successive generations of Americans determined were insufficient
to their changing needs.
Hill’s argument against an anti-poll
tax amendment did not begin and end with a simple invocation of tradition for
tradition’s sake, of course. Like Russell the day before, the senator from
Alabama was prepared to pull out all the stops. To that end, he also made a
point of noting that the actual costs of the poll tax in his state were, in his
words, “extremely moderate. They range from $1 to $1.50. The influence of the
tax on the size of the electorate is [therefore] too insignificant for anyone
even to attempt to measure.” As if this were not evidence enough, Hill then
went on to further affirm that some prerequisites must inevitably
accompany voting no matter how liberal the electoral system. “To register,” he
began,
A person must go to a particular place
where the registration is held. Persons do not register in their own homes;
they must go to the courthouse or to some other place designated for that
purpose. Furthermore, in order to vote, a citizen must go to the polling place.
He must transport himself to that place. When he gets there, sometimes he must
stand in line before he may vote. It may take some time out of a very busy day
for him to stand and wait his turn to exercise his right to the ballot and to
vote. So […] there are certain prerequisites to voting, and this little tax is
one of them.
Hill’s assertion
that “a little tax” was just one of many potential obligations every American
was bound to fulfil in attempting to cast their ballot vastly oversimplified
the issue at hand, of course. There were indeed a great many things which a
person might be required to do in order to exercise their right to vote, from
registering, to applying for an absentee ballot, to standing in line, to
putting off personal obligations. But inasmuch as it is the theoretical aim of
every democratic society to encourage voter turnout – so that the officials
accordingly elected represent the will of their constituents as accurately as
possible – most democratic governments tend to put in place such procedures and
policies as to render the process of voting as easy and as painless as is
possible.
The United
States, in this regard, is– and was – no different. Absentee ballots cost
nothing to apply for and come with prepaid return envelopes. Polling stations
are generally allocated so as to keep wait times to a minimum. Registration is
often a one-time necessity and requires relatively little paperwork. These measures
are certainly not foolproof or infallible – people have still waited in long
lines, still encountered problems with their absentee ballots – but they have
done a great deal, collectively, to eliminate the most common barriers to
voting. But whereas the inconveniences Hill noted represent either the
unavoidable failure of otherwise sound policy or else the inevitable
consequence of attempting to solve complicated logistical problems, the poll
tax that he was defending served no purpose other than to act as a barrier to
voting. Granted, the revenue generated was often put to use funding public
schools. Indeed, Hill made a point of noting exactly that. But a tax on
whiskey, say, or cigarettes could have served the same purpose without
compromising the ability of the economically disadvantaged to cast a ballot.
Far from being a necessary prerequisite to voting, therefore – that is,
something unpleasant but functionally unavoidable – the poll tax represented a
deliberate attempt to make voting more difficult for those most in need.
None of this, of
course, made any never mind to the likes of Senator Hill. Like Senator Russell
had been before him, he was less interested in the facts on the ground in
states where poll taxes remained on the books than in defending the right of
any given state to levy such taxes as it pleased. Nor, for that matter, did it
at all rankle the sensitivities of Senator James O. Eastland (1904-1986), the
Mississippi Democrat who next asked to take the floor. Quite the opposite, in
fact. Far from seeking to counter Hill’s assertions, Eastland sought instead to
continue his colleague’s exploration of the supposed harmlessness of the poll
tax. “Does the Senator know whether the poll tax in Alabama disqualifies
anybody from voting?” he asked. “I do not think the poll tax in Alabama
disqualifies anybody from voting [,]” Hill responded. “I do not know of anyone
in Alabama who does not have a dollar and a half that he cannot contribute to
the education of the youth in Alabama in order to vote.” Eastland pressed on. “Does
not the Senator think that that is true in all the States which have the poll
tax?” he said. “I think that is true in all those States [,]” answered Hill. “I
think the Senator would say the same thing about his own State of Mississippi.”
The Alabaman then went on to add – as if his point had not sufficiently been
made – that “The poll tax does not prevent anyone from voting. Can it be that a
citizen of a State does not have enough interest in the welfare and progress of
his State to make the little contribution of a dollar or a dollar and a half to
the education of the youth of his State, so that the citizen may vote?”
It was, on
balance, a substantially pointless exchange. Both men represented states where
poll taxes were still being collected. And so neither man had any reason to
call into question the validity of the same. On the contrary, they had every
reason to make those who did not pay the poll tax appear miserly, foolish, or
otherwise “un-American.” “Can it be that a citizen of a State does not have
enough interest in the welfare and progress of his State to make the little
contribution of a dollar or a dollar and a half to the education of the youth
of his State [?]” Hill asked. Another senator, thus engaged with Hill in this
same line of questioning, might have responded by telling him that some
Americans who wanted to vote simply couldn’t spare a dollar to do so. They
might even have asked him, as a corollary, whether requiring people to pay a
sum of money in order to vote regardless of their economic circumstances
effectively amounted to voter suppression. But Eastland didn’t request the
floor so that he could actually engage in a debate with his colleague from
Alabama. On the contrary, as someone who had a vested interest in keeping the
government of his own state from looking needlessly cruel, he was simply
seeking to offer his support to someone who shared this same position.
After next going
on to compare the poll tax to the dues required to be paid by the
member-nations of the UN – non-payment of which the Kennedy Administration had
lately stated should disqualify member nations from voting, leading Eastland to
conclude that the US Government “endorsed the principle of the poll tax” – the
pair were thankfully interrupted by the previously-silent Senator Holland. The
chief architect of the anti-poll tax amendment had evidently had enough, and at
this moment chose to initiate his own line of questioning. First, Holland asked
Hill if it was required, in Alabama, for a citizen of voting age to pay the
poll tax in order to cast a ballot. Hill said that it was, though he emphasized
that the minimum cost was one dollar and fifty cents and that the accumulated
cost – for consecutive years of non-payment – could amount to no more than
three dollars. When Holland then seized upon this figure of three dollars – “is
it not true that a citizen between the ages of 22 and 45 must pay $3 or 2
years' poll tax in order to be qualified to vote?” – Hill again attempted to
minimize the significance of any such payment. “If a person lets a year or more
go by,” he said, “or, as I said, if he lets as many as 15 years go by, or if he
lets as many as 20 years go by, he never has to pay more than $3.” Undeterred,
Holland sought to clarify: “But he does have to pay $3?” Hill’s answer was
characteristically dismissive. “If he has not kept up his poll tax,” he said,
“the little tax of $1.50—every cent of which, as I have said, is devoted to the
public schools of Alabama—if he has not kept that tax current and paid each
year, the most he would have to pay would be $3.”
Senator Eastland
then stepped in again by way of a diversion. “Does not the Senator think that
the $3 that a person must pay is quite puny and does not discommode anyone?” he
said. Hill’s response might as well have been rehearsed. “I thoroughly agree
with the Senator from Mississippi [,]” he said. “Certainly it does not
discommode anybody. After all, what citizen is there, who has a proper interest
in his State […] who is not perfectly willing to pay this small amount of
$1.50?” The phrasing that Hill employed here is particularly worth noting. He
did not ask whether they were any citizens who were not perfectly able
to pay the poll tax. Rather, he asked whether they were any citizens not
perfectly willing. Evidently, the senator from Alabama was particularly
keen on insinuating that non-payment of the poll tax was a choice, that no one
was in a position where they literally could not afford to pay it, and that
those who chose not to do so lacked “a proper interest” in the general welfare
of their state. When one also takes into account the racial component of the
discussion at hand, the impression that Senator Hill was trying to cultivate
becomes clearer still. What was the Alabaman saying about those who failed to
pay the poll tax? That they were uninterested either in voting or in contributing
to the general welfare. And who, by design, were generally unable to pay the
tax? The economically disadvantaged members of the nation’s Black community. So
what, then, was Hill trying to say without simply coming out with the words?
That the nation’s Black community didn’t care about voting, that they didn’t
care about supporting schools, and that it could accordingly be said that they lacked
“a proper interest” in public affairs. This was, of course, a very old canard –
that Black people are lazy, or unmotivated, or generally quiescent – but one
which many a Southerner would still have cleaved to in the early 1960s. And it
was for this reason, no doubt, that Senator Hill sought to deploy it. Lacking
in proof or not, it conformed to what many of his colleagues already believed
in their hearts.
Holland, for his
part, remained unmoved by this relatively subtle bit of race-baiting. And so, as
was his wont, he attempted to steer things back on track. “A man and his wife
would have to pay $6 in order for both of them to be qualified to vote in a
primary election or in a general election in Alabama […] would they not?” he
asked Hill. The Alabama Democrat seemed to bristle. “No [,]” he said. “The only
time when they would have to pay $6 would be when they were in default. If they
were current in the payment of that tax, they would have to pay only $1.50 a
piece.” Eastland – as though he and Senator Hill were members of a Vaudeville-era
comedy team – then jumped in yet again. “The answer to the question of the
Senator from Florida is that in the vast majority of cases he is wrong, is he
not?” he said. “Yes [,]” said Hill. “In 99 percent of the cases he is wrong, is
he not?” said Eastland. “Yes [,]” repeated Hill. “He is undertaking to cite the
most extreme case. He must be thinking about the people of his own State, not
the people of Alabama.” Neither man, to be sure, offered any evidence to back
their claim. In ninety-nine percent of cases, they said, people paid the poll
tax and were thus free to cast a ballot when the time came. From where did they
source this figure? Was the underlying data up to date? Neither of them seemed
inclined to say, if indeed it was possible for them to do so. Practically
speaking, then, the claim that they were making was entirely lacking any basis
in fact.
Senator Holland, as ever, remained
unphased. “So far as the people of Florida are concerned,” he replied to Hill’s
parting jibe, “they have not had to pay a poll tax since 1937—which I think is
a sound thing.” Again, the fact that the
elimination of the poll tax was tied to his own history as a public servant was
never all that far from the conversation at hand. He then continued: “Does not
the Senator from Alabama know that the amendment which I and 66 other Senators
propose does not prohibit the imposition of a poll tax as a prerequisite to
voting in State and local elections, but relates only to the election of
President, Vice President, and Members of Congress?” Hill’s response,
unsurprisingly, was to shift his angle of attack yet again. He had implied that
eliminating the poll tax went against the intentions of the Framers. He had
argued that the poll tax was but one of many requirements Americans were
required to fulfil in order to vote. And he had declared, unequivocally, that
the individual cost of the poll tax was so low as to be inconsiderable to any
individual who actually desired to vote. Now, faced with Holland’s avowal that
an anti-poll tax amendment would only apply to federal elections, Senator Hill
of Alabama decried the chaos which was bound to result. “Can the Senator from
Florida think of anything which would be more confusing [,]” he said
Or would require more bookkeeping,
redtape, and all that sort of thing, than to require the payment of a poll tax […]
if one wishes to vote in elections for State and local officers, but then say, “But
so far as national elections are concerned, the payment of a poll tax will not
be required.” I cannot think of anything that would be more divisive or
confusing or would come nearer to undermining the system of obtaining, by means
of the payment of this small amount of money, funds to be used for the
education of our youth.
Before Holland
had a chance to respond, Eastland again jumped in. “Why should not a man pay a
poll tax in order to be able to vote in an election for Members of Congress?”
he said. “I know of no reason why he should not [,]” said Hill. “What is the
difference between paying a poll tax in order to be able to vote in an election
for Members of Congress and paying a poll tax in order to be able to vote in an
election for the Governor of the State?” asked Eastland. “There is no
difference [,]” said Hill, “and certainly there is no reason why a poll tax
should not be paid in order to qualify to vote in all elections.” It was a
strange argument the two were making, if it could indeed be called an argument.
“There is no reason why a poll tax should not be paid in order to qualify to
vote in all elections [,]” said Hill, as if that was the beginning and the end
of the matter. Neither man argued why this should be the case – why any
citizen of the United States should have been made to pay a fee in order to
exercise one of the fundamental rights to which they were entitled. Rather,
they simply acted as though the underlying reasoning was self-evident. “Why
should not a man pay a poll tax in order to be able to vote in an election for
Members of Congress?” said Eastland. “I know of no reason why he should not
[,]” said Hill. The brazen disregard for basic democratic norms which these two
United States Senators thus gleefully displayed would almost be impressive were
it not so deeply disquieting.
Holland –
doubtless growing tired of this senseless back-and-forth – responded to this
fairly nauseating display by offering what he doubtless hoped would be a
substantial blow to Hill’s earlier argument. Was it not true, he said,
irrespective of what the senator from Alabama had just declared,
That on the present registration
rolls in the State of Alabama, places have to be left for exemptions for those
who are veterans and for exemptions for those who are over a certain age, and
for exemptions for other reasons; and is it not true that it has not proven to
be difficult at all to have little stamped showings of exemptions appear on the
same registration roll?
It was, by and
large, a perfectly cogent point on Holland’s part. Hill’s complaint had been
that creating a system in which people were required to pay the poll tax in
some circumstances but not in others would simply be too confusing to even
contemplate. But it was already true that certain people in Alabama weren’t
required to pay the poll tax because they qualified for an exception. People over
the age of forty-five weren’t required to pay; nor were veterans; nor were
certain others. As every year went by and more people turned forty-five, and
more people were discharged from the military, and more people were able to
qualify for whatever other exceptions were on offer, didn’t this create a great
deal of complexity on its own? And hadn’t the government of the State of
Alabama managed to sort things out just fine? So what, then, was so complicated
about creating another species of exception? What was so hard about creating
“little stamped showings of exemptions [to] appear on the same registration
roll?”
Naturally –
given that they were most assuredly less interested in engaging in an exchange
of ideas than simply saying the things they felt obligated to say – neither
Hill nor Eastland were given pause by this inquiry, or else felt at all
compelled to provide Holland with an answer. On the contrary, their response
was to further hammer on their core talking point. “Does not the Senator from
Alabama think the distinguished Senator from Florida has just now destroyed his
own argument?” Eastland began. “In Alabama, one who is 45 years of age is
exempt, is he not?” Hill answered with a simple, “That is correct.” “And veterans
are also exempt, are they not?” Eastland continued. “That is correct [,]” Hill
repeated. “When the Senator from Florida refers to a requirement to pay $3,”
said Eastland, “he is picking out a few, little, puny cases here and there, is
he not? “Yes [,]” Hill responded. “The requirement to pay $3 itself does not
disenfranchise anyone, does it?” Eastland asked. “That is correct [,]” Hill
concluded, “there are only a few, little, puny cases.” Again, one is struck by
the apparent similarity between this pair of Southern senators and an early 20th
century comedy duo. They had not at all demonstrated how it was that Senator
Holland has supposedly “destroyed his own argument,” but their patter was
nothing if not snappy and to-the-point.
Hill and
Eastland’s primary strategy, such as it was, was decidedly one of minimization.
They did not seek to dispute the fact that the existence of the poll tax
prevented some people from being able to cast a ballot. On the contrary,
they were of the opinion that this was only right and proper. When the cause
being funded was the education of the next generation of American citizens,
what kind of person could possibly object to being parted from a dollar or two?
Well, whoever they were – miserly, selfish, quite lacking in civic spirit –
they were very few in number. “A few, little, puny cases [,]” the pair agreed.
Insignificant. Not worth considering. In light of the fact that these two men
represented Southern states in which the segregationist Jim Crow regime
remained largely intact, their characterization of the number of people in
Alabama disenfranchised by the poll tax as “few,” “little,” and “puny” would
seem once more to warrant a certain amount of scrutiny. Being both of them
products of a society – that is, the white, middle-class South of the early 20th
century – wherein “separate but equal” was the unquestioned rule, Black people
were functionally regarded as something less than full citizens, and lynchings
occurred with startling regularity, it would not be at all difficult to imagine
Hill and Eastland alike considering the disenfranchisement of several million
Black Americans as being inconsiderable in the grand scheme.
The
disenfranchisement of the region’s Black community, after all, had been one of
the central goals of Southern lawmakers, executive officials, and judges since
the ratification of the 15th Amendment in the winter of 1870. And
the entire purpose of the poll tax was to help achieve this exact objective. So
why, then, should Hill and Eastland have been anything other than dismissive? Indeed,
it would be fair to say that there was no reason to expect otherwise. From
their perspective – along with that of many of their fellow Southerners in
Congress – the disenfranchisement of the South’s Black inhabitants really was a
trifling thing. The entire purpose of the law, to them, was the continual
entrenchment of white control. And no matter how often or how convincingly
anyone might argue to the contrary – or even suggest that certain customary
practices ultimately did more harm than good – they were not prepared to change
their minds. The Jim Crow regime had been plodding along for the better part of
a century, and in that time had ground down generations of Black Americans to a
state of legal helplessness and spiritual indignity under the sheer weight of
its manifold mechanisms of oppression. The white, Democratic South, in that
time, had managed not only to prevent the fundamental upending of the
established racial power structure which the Reconstruction had seemed to
presage, but they had further succeeded in solidifying their grip on local
political power to the point that Sothern society became governed, in effect,
by a kind of ethno-political oligarchy. In consequence, from the perspective of
men like J. Lister Hill and James Eastland – beneficiaries of this culture, to
be sure – there really was no reason to admit that anything was amiss.
Institutionalized racial oppression had worked out just fine for the South, and
any evidence to the contrary could be safely and entirely dismissed.
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