Putting aside whatever personal or professional goals Ethan
Allen might have hoped to achieve with the publication of An Animadversory Address,
its obvious purpose was to further the cause of Vermont and its residents
against the contrary assertions of neighboring New York. While Allen attempted
this in a number of ways, varying in approach, stress, and emphasis, perhaps
the most striking, then as now, were the parallels he perceived linking the
conflict between Vermont and New York to that between the United States and
Great Britain. Though New York was evidently amenable to the participation of
Allen and the Green Mountain Boys within the context of the wider Revolutionary
War, this did not equate to a settlement of the dispute between the two
parties. Though they had found common cause in the struggle against Britain’s
claimed prerogatives in America, the revolutionary government of New York was
evidently no more willing to admit the illegitimacy of its claim to the New
Hampshire Grants than Parliament was to its right to tax the colonies “in all
cases whatsoever.” Allen accordingly seized upon New York’s apparent
intransigence, and its haughty assumption of an inherited prerogative, in order
to make it clear to any that read An Animadversory Address that Vermont’s
neighbor and ally was guilty of hypocrisy in the extreme.
The manner by which Allen attempted to make clear the
circumstances of New York’s misconduct were various, though linked by the
general theme of portraying the state as possessing particularly un-revolutionary
sensibilities. In the thirteenth paragraph, for example, he sought to explain
the root of New York’s claim to the territory of Vermont by making reference to
recent royal judgements as to the extent of the former colony’s governing
charter. It was not until 1764, Allen asserted, “When the now English King, for
certain political reasons […] extended the jurisdiction of New-York over the
premises, by his special royal authority.”
This was not a matter of good fortune, he maintained, but a consequence
of persistent favoritism. “New-York has ever been [the Crown’s] favourite
government [,]” he continued. “They could almost vie with Great-Britain in the
art of vassalaging common people, and in erasing every idea of liberty from the
human mind, by making and keeping them poor and servile.” New York, Allen evidently
believed, was guilty of perpetuating a legacy of royal preference, and sought
to take advantage of judgements handed down by an authority they had themselves
repudiated by declaring their independence. At a time when the people of New
York – soldiers, sailors, farmers, merchants, and ordinary townspeople alike –
were engaged in a struggle whose stated ideals were “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness,” this was a damning accusation indeed.
The implication of New York’s behavior vis-à-vis Vermont was
made worse by what Allen described in paragraph fifteen of An Animadversory Address
as its wholly voluntary nature. In response to the offer made by Governor
George Clinton of a general pardon for all those involved with the “pretended
state of Vermont,” Allen claimed that recent events should have rendered the
issue moot. “It was a matter which formerly respected Governor Tryon,” he
wrote, “The old Legislature of New-York, and the Green Mountain Boys [.]” The
state of New York, an entity which had only come into existence in the summer
of 1776, was not a party to the dispute in question, and the connotation of its
claiming to inherit the position of the former Province of New York were, to
Allen, troubling. The people of Vermont, he avowed,
Resent it,
that the Legislature of the state of New-York have, so late in the day,
undertook to give an Unconditional discharge and remission of all penalties and
forfeitures incurred, under an act, which had been long dead; and which, when
alive, served only to discover to the world, the wickedness and depravity of
that legislative body which enacted them.
By offering a pardon to the accused
Green Mountain Boys and their supporters, Allen argued, the state of New York
effectively validated the charges laid against them by the administration of
Royal Governor William Tryon. These charges being particularly draconian, Allen
was understandably concerned by the willingness of New York’s revolutionary
government to uphold them. “I verily believe,” he thereafter concluded, “That
the King’s Commissioners would now be as willing to pardon me for the sin of
rebellion, provided I would afterwards be subject to Britain, as the
Legislature abovementioned, provided I would be a subject to New-York [.]”
Such
a blatant association of the positions maintained by the British government and
the state of New York was doubtless intended to sting those residents of the
latter who read it, and reinforce to those in Vermont the justness of their
continued resistance. Allen drew similar comparisons between the governments of
colonial and post-independence New York within the pages of An Animadversory
Address, and ascribed to both an undue royalist character. In the third
paragraph, for instance, he claimed that Cumberland County, one of the four
that colonial New York had established in the disputed New Hampshire Grants
after 1764, was full of Tories. These royalists, he asserted, “Though the whole
state, are using their influence and intrigues against our new state, in favour
of the government of New-York, which, for certain motives they prefer.” The
implication that Allen attempted to draw with this sentence was subtle, but no
less critical. If the Tories of Cumberland County appeared favorable to the
government of New York, it might reasonably have been argued that this was
because New York was either controlled by Tories itself or was sympathetic to
their aims (i.e., stymying the Revolution and reasserting royal authority).
This connection was made clearer in the twenty-ninth paragraph of An Animadversory
Address. While expressing sympathy for the suffering his countrymen in
Vermont had experienced in the 1770s at the hands of New York’s colonial
government, Allen declared, “It is manifest, that the new government are minded
to follow nearly in their steps.” Considering, again, how much New Yorkers had
themselves suffered since the Revolution began in 1775 – the men who had fought
and died at Long Island, White Plains, and Saratoga, and the residents of New
York City who had lived under occupation since 1776 – this would surely have
seemed a bitter accusation.
The
truth of the matter – shockingly – was somewhat more complicated than Ethan
Allen made it out. George Clinton, Governor of New York from 1777 to 1795 and
the state official upon which Allen seem to foist the balance of his suspicion,
was just about the last contemporary American statesman to whom the label
“royalist” could be said to apply. Noted during his first term in office as a
bitter opponent of his state’s sizable Tory population, he took to seizing the
property of those openly supportive of the Crown in order to keep taxes low and
help pay for New York’s share of the war effort. Furthermore, the nature of the
dispute between the residents of Vermont and the government(s) of New York was
in certain key aspects unlike that which had emerged between the American
colonies and Great Britain. The complaints nurtured by the various colonists,
distilled by their representatives in the First and Second Continental
Congresses, were at their core philosophical. It was not the fact of taxation
that heaped such ire upon the Sugar Act (1764), the Stamp Act (1765), and the
Tea Act (1773), but rather the principle under which Britain attempted to enact
it. By seeking to apply direct taxes to their American dependencies, an act
customarily reserved to the elected representatives of those taxed, British
ministers in the 1760s and 1770s threatened to overthrown over a century of
precedent and establish in its place the principle of arbitrary, unlimited
taxation. The peril under which colonial Americans accordingly labored in the
years immediately preceding the Revolution was thus more prospective than
immediate – they feared what might be rather than what was.
The residents of
the New Hampshire Grants, and later the State of Vermont, were faced during
this same period with a somewhat more urgent threat. The administrations of
colonial Governor William Tryon and state Governor George Clinton did not
attempt to assert the legitimacy of a principle which they may or may not have
chosen to apply in the future. Rather, both governments declared their
authority over the lands falling within the New Hampshire Grants and attempted
to extort the submission of all property owners within that territory. Those
residents of the disputed region who paid to have their land claims validated
(the charges often exceeding the original purchase price) were left in peace.
Those who refused, or were simply unable to comply, were dispossessed of what
had formerly been their property. At issue, then, was not the validity of an
abstract philosophical principle, but the right of people who had purchased
land legally to enjoy its benefits freely and without harassment. In this sense
the “Vermont Revolution,” to coin a phrase, was at its core a struggle based on
a much more pragmatic principle than the larger American Revolution. Certainly
the people of Vermont were concerned about the claimed right of Britain to tax
its unrepresented American subjects – their willingness to participate in the
Revolutionary War attests to the fact – but their conflict with New York was
about something much simpler. What Vermonters like Ethan Allen and Seth Warner
had crusaded for since 1770, and New York had called into question, was the right
of an individual to purchase private property and dispose of it however they
wished, free of the interference of a third party. This was not a discussion
that really formed a part of the larger American Revolutionary narrative, and
attempting to draw parallels between the two (as with An Animadversory Address)
is more than a little problematic.
That being said, Allen’s attempt to juxtapose Great Britain
and New York as equals in tyranny was not wholly without substance. While
Britain’s motives in attempting to supress an American insurrection were
arguably economic and political, and New York’s vis-à-vis Vermont perhaps more
a matter of reputation, both entities seemed to draw their sense of authority
from a similar source. Each claimed a prerogative to do whatever they wished to
do, and manifested a comparable resistance to seeing that prerogative
questioned or diminished. For their part, British authorities claimed that the
sovereignty of the Crown and Parliament over the American colonies was absolute,
owing to the manner by which those colonies had been established. By granting
charters to groups like the Virginia Company or individuals like William Penn,
the Crown had thereby delegated a portion of its sovereignty without
necessarily abandoning the claim to which it applied. This meant, in the eyes
of the British government, that though colonies like Pennsylvania were unique,
self-governing political entities, they were not sovereign. Consequently,
Britain was at liberty to dispose of its American dependencies as it wished,
needing no more permission than that granted by Parliament as the sole
legislature of the realm. This principle – that Crown and Parliament were respectively
sovereign and supreme – was rooted in the hard-won British ideal of constitutional
monarchy. To question its application in the American context would doubtless
have been construed by many in government as a fundamental threat to the
underpinnings of the contemporary British state.
New York, though a colony of Britain itself, seemed to adopt
a similar tack in its dealings with residents of the disputed New Hampshire
Grants. The authority under which it claimed ownership of the region, and the
concomitant right to sell land within it, was rooted into the original 1664
letters patent that granted the land lying between the Delaware and Connecticut
rivers to James, Duke of York (1633-1701). The resulting Province of New York
(named in honor of its proprietor) became a Crown Colony in 1685 when the Duke
ascended the throne as James II, and was thereafter subdivided numerous times
over the century that followed. Governors William Tryon and George Clinton both
maintained, however, that none of these subdivisions included the territory
falling roughly between the Hudson and Connecticut rivers to which New
Hampshire Governor Benning Wentworth laid claim in the 1740s. The disputed
region, the government of New York asserted consistently between that time and
the 1770s, was and always had been under its particular authority.
Consequently, if said government chose to invalidate the land grants made by
another colony that had no right to do so and make sale of further grants to
those willing to render payment, there was no power under the sun save perhaps
that of Parliament which could stand in their way. Because this stance was
taken in reference to the “ancient and original” grant of land that had given
birth to New York in the 17th century, resistance to it – as offered
by the Green Mountain Boys – could potentially have been construed in some
circles as a threat of the legitimacy of New York itself. Though the colonial
Province of New York was subsequently replaced by an independent state whose
very existence was a in some ways a repudiation of the entity that had preceded
it, the government of the latter appeared similarly disinclined to allow what
it perceived as a partition of its territory. Colony or state, New York was New
York; the borders of the two were theoretically identical, and to allow any
violation thereof was no doubt perceived as a potential threat to the
sovereignty of the whole.
Against such seemingly intractable claims as Great Britain
and New York offered against America and Vermont, the United States and Ethan
Allen put forth strikingly similar solutions. To British claims of sovereignty
over the American colonies, the colonists themselves asserted that sovereignty
could only derive from the consent of the governed. Having been refused the
opportunity to give their consent by being denied representation in Parliament,
the united colonies instead asserted their sovereign right to declare
themselves independent of any higher authority than what they themselves chose
to acknowledge. This essentially served to designate the Kingdom of Great
Britain and its former colonies as legally separate and equal entities, none of
which could claim authority over any other. Ethan Allen made much the same
assertion in An Animadversory Address by making reference to the legal and
sovereign equality of Vermont and the members of the United States. In the
sixth paragraph, for example, he claimed that the constitution Vermont had
adopted in 1777 was well-regarded, “In such parts of the eastern states, where
it has been circulated [,]” and that, “There is little, I may say less
dissatisfaction in the state of Vermont, as to matters of government, as in any
of the eastern states [.]” By comparing Vermont and the “eastern states” in
terms of how their respective constitutions had been received – constitution-making
being among the most significant expressions of sovereignty a given community
can undertake – Allen thereby implied a fundamental equality between them. If
New York, or New Hampshire, or Pennsylvania had felt themselves in a position
to create constitutions, then the fact that Vermont had done the same would
seem to indicate that it was independent in the same way as any one of the
thirteen United States.
An Animadversory Address reinforced this
idea in its eighth paragraph, wherein Allen declared quite plainly that
Vermont’s assumption of an independent government, “Puts us on an equal footing
with our old New-York adversaries, and will enable us to baffle all their
schemes.” By tying independence to resisting the “schemes” perpetrated by neighboring
New York, the purpose of Vermont’s self-declared autonomy would seem to have
been mainly pragmatic. Allen further expanded on this idea in paragraph
twenty-eight. As a practical measure, he claimed, independence and
self-government permitted Vermont to better oppose both the depredations of
invading British armies and the meddling of a jealous regime in New York bent
on reclaiming what it continued to regard as the New Hampshire Grants. Maintaining, “inviolable the supremacy of the
legislative authority of the independent state of Vermont,” Allen accordingly
argued, represented the, “Shortest, best, and most eligible […] way of vacating
those New-York interfering grants [.]” “This,” he continued, “At one stroke,
overturns every New-York scheme which may be calculated for our ruin, makes us
free men, [and] confirms our property [.]” The same justification could easily
have been applied to the United States as a whole; the legislative authority
asserted by the various states, in addition to satisfying a larger
philosophical argument, served the practical purpose of helping to frustrate Britain’s
attempts to reaffirm its claimed authority. If Vermont had arrived at
independence via the same basic route as the states represented in Congress, the
ability of any one of those states to declare Vermont’s autonomy illegitimate
would seem thereby somewhat constrained.
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