References aside, it remains to discuss the actual content
of Thoughts on Government and the
influence that it held over subsequent attempts at constitution-making in the
United States. As mentioned in a previous post, Adams was asked for his
recommendations as they specifically applied to the attempts undertaken by the
various states in the 1770s to draft new governing charters. Consequently, many
(though not all) of the early states constitutions follow the outline contained
in Thoughts on Government fairly
closely. It’s also worth noting how (or whether) Adams’ suggestions were
translated into the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. Though the
Articles, the first governing charter of the United States, were written around
the same time as the state constitutions and shortly after Thoughts on Government was published, they significantly deviate
from Adams’ preferred formula. Conversely, the Constitution, written over a
decade later in 1787 by men who had served in a variety of legislative roles
and come to appreciate the naivety of their county’s early efforts at
republican government, seems to hew much closer to Adams’ ideal arrangement in
certain key respects.
This arrangement, Adams laid out in a fairly straightforward
manner. After determining that a republic would be the preferred form of
government, being based in virtue and most likely to preserve and promote the
happiness of the people, he determined that a representative assembly should be
the principal tool of legislation. This assembly, he argued, would, “depute
power from the many to a few of the most wise and good,” yet should also be,
“in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel,
reason, and act like them.” At the same time, this assembly should not be the
only body tasked with shaping or administering the laws. Single assemblies,
Adams asserted in paragraph fourteen, are susceptible to the “vices, follies,
and frailties of an individual; subjects to fits of humor, starts of passion,
flights on enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudice, and consequently productive
of hasty results and absurd judgements.” Such a legislative body would also be
liable to guard its own interests at the behest of the people’s and increase
its own privileges over time, and would be poorly suited to wield either
judicial power (being too numerous, clumsy and ill-suited) or executive power
(lacking the needed confidentiality or decisiveness). Therefore, Adams wrote in
paragraphs seventeen and eighteen, there should be a second house of the
legislature whose purpose would be to hold the assembly to account and mediate
between the interests of that popular branch and those of the executive. This
second house, or council, would be elected by the assembly from among its own
members, or its constituents, or both, be of a relatively limited number (Adams
suggests twenty or thirty), and be able to exercise an independent judgement
(and a veto) in matters of the law.
As to the executive power, Adams suggested in paragraph
nineteen that the two houses of the legislature, the assembly and the council,
should elect a governor by joint ballot. This person would himself be free to
exercise his own judgement, act as commander-in-chief of all militias and
armies, and possess the power to hand out pardons. The governor would also be
able to veto any acts of the legislature, though he should be inclined to do so
only when it is clear that a proposed law runs counter to the overall public good.
Adams also proposed that joint ballots of both houses be held to elect the
lieutenant-governor, secretary, treasurer, commissary, and attorney-general,
and that, along with the election of the members of the legislative assembly, such
votes should be held annually. Adams similarly argued in paragraph twenty-four
that a rotation of offices would be prudent, provided that “the society has a
sufficient number of suitable characters to supply the great number of
vacancies which would be made by such a rotation.” While ultimately leaving it
up to the states to decide for themselves, he suggested an interval of three
years in office to be followed by three years of exclusion.
In paragraphs twenty-seven through twenty-nine, Adams
advocated for an independent judicial branch. Judges and justices, he wrote,
should ideally be nominated and appointed by the governor with the advice and
consent of the legislative council. They should also possess powers and
responsibilities distinct from both the legislative or executive branches, and
“be always men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals,
great patience, calmness, coolness, and attention.” In order to prevent these
legal officials from becoming beholden to private interests, Adams further
recommended that they should hold their offices for life during good behavior,
and that their salaries should be fixed by law.
Thoughts on Government
contains a variety of other recommendations, having to do with militia laws,
the elections of sheriffs and county officials, and the importance of liberal
education, but those laid out above constitute the general framework that Adams
endorsed. It is, I think, worth noting that at no point did he advise the
inclusion of any kind of bill of rights. Such protections of individual
liberties did find their way into many of the state constitutions written in
the 1770s, though often in wildly differing forms, and its inclusion in the
Constitution of 1787 was considered by many to be an absolute necessity. It’s
possible that Adams did not believe it worth including in his essential
blueprint because he felt a government structured along the lines he suggested would
not be inclined to invade the rights of the people (being directly tied to them
by their frequently elected representatives). Among other things this arguably
demonstrates the naïveté of Adams and his compatriots. Never having had to
create governments from scratch, the plans they ultimately decided upon were
theoretically sound, but at times ill-equipped to handle the rigours of
day-to-day administration, and ignorant of the tenacity of some of human
nature’s darker aspects.
Though the eleven states constitutions that were written after
Thoughts on Government was published
in the spring of 1776 largely followed the pattern Adams laid out, because
there was really no one traditional or time-tested blueprint to abide by the
occasional eccentric addition or alteration was not uncommon. Some varied the
way that certain officers of the government were to be elected. The
Constitution of North Carolina, for example, followed Adams’ program very
closely, changed only to allow the voters to elect senators directly instead of
the assembly. Maryland’s constitution followed a similar tack, but called for
the election of state senators by specific electors, to be selected by the
voters every five years. New Jersey’s 1776 constitution, written in haste, also
adhered to the assembly/council/governor arrangement, but allowed Supreme Court
justices to be elected jointly by the assembly and council for seven year
terms, and all other judicial officials for five year terms. Others added offices
or administrative bodies to Adams’ ideal composition. Delaware did so, adding
to its executive branch a Privy Council of four members, elected by and from
the assembly and council, whose purpose was to advise the Governor and consent
to his decisions. Virginia’s charter called for a similar body, with eight
members instead of four, to be elected either from the assembly, council, or
the general public.
Perhaps the most radically different of the 1770s
constitutions was Pennsylvania’s. Drafted by a body of legislators and
scholars, including one Benjamin Franklin, it allowed all men twenty-one and older
who had paid taxes to vote (thus abandoning the traditional property
qualification that prevailed in most states for decades after the Revolution),
and outlined a unicameral legislature, a twelve-member Supreme Executive
Council that elected its own President, and a judiciary appointed for seven
year terms and removable at any time. In addition, the Pennsylvania
constitution called for a Council of Censors, to be elected every seven years
and tasked with holding the government to account, censuring government actions
or legislation deemed to have violated the constitution, and calling
conventions for the purpose of drafting amendments. While it’s difficult to
determine why exactly the Keystone State’s constitution differed so
aggressively from those of its counterparts, it may have had something to do
with the traditions of government that had been established under the earlier
colonial regime. After all, by 1776, Pennsylvania already possessed an
established history of stable, democratic rule, and it’s entirely likely that
Pennsylvanians preferred to follow their own lights than the advice of a
well-intentioned Boston lawyer.
Even the Constitution of Massachusetts, which Adams played a
large part in drafting in 1779, differed somewhat from the plan that Thoughts on Government laid out. Though
government in Massachusetts was divided into three independent branches, with a
bicameral legislature and annual elections for major offices, it also allowed
the election of Senators and the Governor by all qualified voters. This admission
to democratic government seems uncharacteristic of Adams, though it was
actually quite typical of the era. The 1770s were a volatile decade in the
history of the United States, and there is a definite sense when reading
documents from that time that the American Founders were “working without a
net,” and were distinctly aware of the fact. They had few blueprints to draw
on, few practical examples to follow, and reams and reams of theories and
concepts to puzzle over, dissect and reassemble in new and different ways. The state constitutions written during this
era are a prime example of this process; though they tended to hold fast to a
handful of basic principles, so much else was left on the table, to be
determined by each state as their needs dictated. And Adams seemed aware of this, too. In paragraph
twenty-three, he wrote:
“This mode of constituting the great offices of state will answer very well for the present; but if by experiment it should be found inconvenient, the legislature may, at its leisure, devise other methods of creating them…or make any other alterations which the society shall find productive of its ease, its safety, its freedom, or, in one word, its happiness.”
As the Framers of the
later United States Constitution would tacitly admit by their inclusion of a
robust amending formula, stable governments were born out of sound principles,
but they lived and died in the hearts and minds of their citizens. And in the
1770s the hearts and minds of Americans were distinctly undecided as to what,
other than the essentials, constituted good republican government. John Adams
had his ideas on this topic, and put them forward in Thoughts on Government, but even he (stubborn and often obstinate
man that he was) was willing to admit that there was no one way forward.